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The study sought to examine whether over or undervaluation of securities drove capital structure 
decisions with a focus on companies that offered corporate debt and rights issues for the period 
between 2006-2016. Main study objective aimed at establishing presence of market timing in 
security issuance by companies listed at the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE). The study was 
anchored on four theories; Market timing, trade-off, pecking order and the irrelevance theories. 
Market timing theory assumes that no optimal capital structure exists for firms and that over or 
undervaluation of securities and conditions existing in the financial markets are the driving 
forces in securities issuance decisions. Trade off theory explains how corporations are usually 
financed partly with debt and partly with equity and that firms determine the type and amount of 
financing to use by trading-off the costs and benefits of both debt and equity. The pecking order 
theory assumes presence of information asymmetry between managers and investors in a firm. 
Equity and debt market timing are enabled by presence of private information asymmetry and 
public information asymmetries respectively. The pecking order further addresses other aspects 
of capital structure including ranking of types of financing used by firms and determinants of 
capital structure; tangibility of assets and firm growth. The “irrelevance theory” contradicts 
market timing theory by assuming market efficiency and that firms cannot increase firm value by 
switching between debt and equity. It addresses capital structure determinants such as 
profitability, non-debt tax shield and liquidity. Study methodologies utilised by the study were; 
an event study methodology, unbalanced panel data regression analysis and descriptive statistics 
for both primary and secondary data. Findings from the study indicate that corporate debt and 
rights issuing firms underperformed similar size non-issuing companies in the 30-day event 
window.MBR which is a measure and proxy for market timing was found to statistically and 
significantly influence market and book leverage which are measures and proxies of capital 
structure. Finance managers were found to have similar views with regard to both equity and 
market timing. The study found out that managers of listed/ intending to be listed firms, look at 
the actions and success of securities issuance decisions taken by other listed/ intending to be 
listed companies in making their financing decisions in such a way that if for example corporate 
debt issue has been successful, managers would issue corporate debt resulting in a sort of 
clustering of the security issues. If security issuance choices taken by the listed companies were 
unsuccessful the finance managers would re-strategize to other ways of financing such as 
borrowing loans from commercial banks or use other alternatives such as retained earnings until 
market conditions becomes favourable. The study concludes that there is presence of market 
timing in security issuance by the listed firms at the NSE. Further, the study concludes that a 
relationship exists between market timing and capital structures of quoted companies at the NSE. 
Presence of market timing in securities issuance enables listed companies to minimise overall 
cost of capital, resulting in shareholder wealth maximization through increased profitability of 
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1.1 Background of the Study 
Market timing refers to a firm’s management actions directed towards capitalizing on temporary 
fluctuations in pricing of security, especially through offering of highly valued securities and 
repurchasing of lowly valued securities. In capital markets, it refers to the practice of offering 
stocks when highly valued by the market, whereas in the money markets, it refers to the practice 
of offering debt when existing interest rates are at their minimum, all aimed at minimizing 
WACC for a company (Zhou, Guo, Chen, & Yang, 2012). According to Modigliani and Miller, 
(1958) different forms of capital costs for firms do not fluctuate in isolation, implying firms 
cannot benefit from expediently switching between equity and debt in the efficient and integrated 
markets that they studied. In the inefficient or segmented capital markets by contrast, current 
stockholders gain from market timing attempts at the cost of incoming and outgoing owners of 
the company. Thus, the management of a firm would be motivated to exploit opening windows 
for financing when such opportunities arise and if they have same interests as ongoing 
shareholders. 
Managers market time due to information gap that exists between company executives and 
investors in the financial markets, a phenomenon that concurs with pecking order theory (Myers 
& Majluf, 1984). Managers market time in the equity market resulting from private information 
gap where company executives possess more information than the investors about their 
companies resulting in mispricing of securities. Additionally, low information gap between 
company executives and investors in the equities market enables managers to take advantage of 
opening windows for financing in this market. Market timing in debt market is achieved through 
public information asymmetry whereby managers use information in public domain to create 
their own timing opportunities. It can also be achieved in circumstances where there is high 
information asymmetry in the equity market, which makes investors turn to debt which is less 
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exposed to information asymmetry. These two situations create dynamics whose results are 
capital structures that may be regarded as optimal for firms (Baker & Wurgler, 2002). 
Baker & Wurgler, (2002), assert that market timing is a major factor which determines whether a 
corporation will use debt or equity in its capital structure. Implying companies pay no attention 
to their use of debt or equity, that the type of funding which emerges to be highly valued by the 
markets when they seek capital is what they choose(Baker & Wurgler, 2002).Market timing is a 
major factor shaping corporate funding choices (Alti, 2006). Market timing theory also known as 
windows of opportunity theory, asserts that external equity is preferred by firms when its cost is 
at its minimum otherwise debt becomes the most preferred type of financing. According to this 
theory, managers in firms sometimes recognize their risky securities as mispriced by the market. 
In such cases, equity or debt are then issued to take advantage of this inefficiency in the market. 
This inefficiency renders financing policies to become ad rem; in that when share prices are high, 
shareholders of a company gain through offering highly priced equity and debt becomes 
desirable, when prices are low, (Baker & Wurgler, 2000).  
Baker & Wurgler, (2002) presented the windows of opportunity theory with reference to firms in 
the US. Further evidence on this theory emanates from G7 countries, Mahajan & Tartaroglu, 
(2008), Dutch companies, De Bie & De Haan, (2007), French entities, Bougatef & Chichti, 
(2010), European countries, Gaud, Jani, Hoesli, & Bender, (2005),Taiwan firms, I.-H. Huang, 
(2014), supplementary support from US companies, Elliott, Koëter-Kant, & Warr,(2004); Alti, 
(2006) and developing countries Henderson et al., (2006); Bo, Huang, & Wang, (2011). Findings 
from these studies indicate that short run presence of market timing can be confirmed, but the 
long run persistence vary considerably. Whereas the short-run impact of market timing is well 
documented in literature Taggart, (1977); Ikenberry et al., (1995); Kayhan & Titman, (2007); De 
Bie & De Haan, (2007), Baker & Wurgler, (2002) are the first to demonstrate how persistent the 
effect market timing was on the debt-equity mix. Criticisms have however, been drawn to the 
market timing theory by Alti, (2006);Hovakimian, (2006); Butler, Grullon, & Weston,(2006) 
who had an issue with the persistent and overall economic significance of market timing. These 
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findings illustrate how empirical study’s findings on market timing are; not only controversial 
but are also inconclusive and mixed. 
Further controversy is drawn from the fact that different variables have been utilised to capture 
market timing attempts. Baker & Wurgler, (2002) used external finance weighted historical 
market to book ratio, EFWAMB to measure the firm’s market timing attempts. Kayhan & 
Titman, (2007) and De Bie & De Haan, (2007) split Baker & Wurgler, (2002) EFWAMB into 
two parts: yearly timing and long-term timing. They use yearly timing (YT) to capture market 
timing. A hot issue market characterized by a clustering of issuers or cold issue market are used 
to capture market timing in equity issuance decisions by Alti, (2006) and in debt issuance 
decisions by Doukas, Guo, & Zhou, (2011). 
Different methods have been employed to capture market timing. Baker & Wurgler, (2002) used 
the ordinary least squares regression model; Elliott, Koëter-Kant, & Warr, (2008) used an 
earnings-based valuation model while other studies have appropriated the generalized least 
squares regression model Bruinshoofd & de Haan, (2012). 
To make the results of market timing even more convoluted, findings from some literature on 
market timing point to forward-looking market timing implying financing choices taken by 
relying on the predictions of upcoming market conditions while other literature report backward-
looking market timing suggesting responses to past and prevailing market environment Baker, 
Greenwood, & Wurgler, (2003; Zhou et al., (2012); Barry, Mann, Mihov, & Rodriguez, (2005); 
Bancel & Mittoo, (2004); Graham & Harvey, (2001). 
Capital structure is regarded as an important area of deliberation for companies since financing 
costs are elemental to a firm's potential to be competitive Ater, (2017b). Siagian & Saad, (2011) 
define capital structure as the manner in which a company funds its assets, mainly by way of a 
mixture of equity, debt and hybrid securities. Capital structure subject remains interesting and 
puzzling, in that debt and equity are critically important to the firms' performance and 
consequently, company executives are tasked with assembling an ideal combination of securities 
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that maximizes firm value. Baker & Wurgler, (2002) refer to capital of a firm as the collective 
product of past efforts to ‘time the market'. They argue that when market conditions are not in 
favour of the firms, managers may choose alternative financing methods such as internal 
financing sources. As a result, the company's cost of capital decreases, and the existing 
stockholders reap a benefit from increased profitability of the firm which maximizes the firm 
value. 
Capital structure has two components debt and equity. In this study corporate debt was taken to 
represent the debt component of capital structure and rights issues to represent equity component 
of capital structure. The study sought to examine if listed firms utilised market timing in issuance 
of securities as a result of which their capital structures would be a collective outcome of the 
market timing attempts. Listed companies issue equity when they are highly priced by the market 
and otherwise, they issue debt. In situations where long term interest rates are perceived as low 
managers of the listed firms issue corporate debt before the interest rates go up. If conditions 
existing in financial market have been favourable the managers will respond by issuing debt or 
equity depending on which market the favourable conditions are present. This dynamics create 
opportune time for executives in the quoted companies to issue the security whose market 
conditions are favourable. As a result, a distortion occurs in capital structure of securities issuing 
firms in such a manner that their capital structures can no longer be described as target or 
optimal capital structures. 
The optimal debt-equity mix for a firm maximizes firm value and reduces the firm’s overall cost 
of capital. According to the market timing theory, an ideal debt-equity mix does not exist; 
managers only select the type of funding which seems highly valued by financial markets. 
Hence, observed capital structures are a collective product of past efforts to time the markets 
(Baker & Wurgler, 2002).However, some literature argue that an optimal capital structure exists. 
Moyo, (2016) studied capital structure choices of financial services firms in South Africa. 
Results from this study dismissed both market timing and pecking order hypotheses. Conclusions 
drawn from this study indicated that stock market performance and share returns do not influence 
security issuance choices of these companies. Study findings strongly validated the dynamic 
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trade-off theory indicating that Johannesburg Securities Exchange listed financial services 
companies have target optimal capital structures which they actively adjust towards. A firm may 
market time by issuing equity or through the issuance of debt.  
Timing of markets is mainly utilized by firms in the growth phase of a company life cycle 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Stulz, (2010). These firms prefer to raise capital through initial public 
offerings (IPO) in spite of the associated costs as the overall cost will be lower than the debt 
interest due to market undervaluation of growth firms. It also guides managers to carry out 
Seasonal Equity Offerings (SEO) during the lifecycle of the firm. Debt is issued when the 
prevailing interest rates in the market are low just before they increase.  
In corporate finance policy market timing is of paramount importance. Four different kinds of 
studies have so far found evidence which can be classified as support for market timing. First, 
when actual funding choices of companies are analyzed, evidence is found to show that 
companies have a high probability to offer equity when they are highly priced by the market and 
will issue debt or repurchase stocks in markets where share repurchase is authorized when their 
market valuations are low. For instance, rights offering correspond with high valuations in  
Hovakimian, Opler, & Titman, (2001), IPOs correspond with high valuations Pagano, Panetta, & 
Zingales, (1998), debt issues are accompanied by low valuations in Henderson, Jegadeesh, & 
Weisbach, (2006) and stock repurchases correspond with low valuations in  Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok, & Vermaelen, (1995). 
Second, when long-run stock returns are analyzed immediately after financing decisions market 
timing is found to be successful. companies will offer equity when they perceive the cost of 
equity to be comparatively low and issue debt and/or repurchase equity when the cost of equity is 
reasonably high Loughran & Ritter, (1995); Spiess & Affleck-Graves, (1995,1999). Third, 
analyzed earnings projections and realized earnings surrounding equity offerings  indicate that 
corporations are predisposed to issue stock when investors are quite passionate about earnings 
projections of a firm, Loughran & Ritter, (1997); Denis & Sarin, (2001). 
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Fourth, and perhaps the most persuasive proof, in anonymous enquiries, managers acknowledge 
market timing. Graham & Harvey, (2001) established that 67% of CFOs surveyed agreed that 
stock under or overvaluation was an essential or extremely essential consideration they made 
when issuing equity, and almost a similar number concurred that if the share price had in the 
recent past risen, the price at which they sold their stock was high. In this study the existing share 
prices are considered more essential than 9 out 10 other aspects put into consideration when 
issuing shares and more essential than the other 4 determinants pondered in the choice to offer 
debt. 
In Africa, Bougatef & Chichti, (2010) studied French and Tunisian quoted companies to 
investigate relevance of market timing considerations in financing decisions taken by these 
firms. Findings from the study conform to market timing in that studied firms only issued equity 
when they were highly valued by the capital markets and after market performance 
improvement. Consequently, these firms recorded reduced leverage levels in the short run and 
this impact lasted more than eight years. Concurring with these findings is a study by Reddy and 
Tran, (2017) who studied capital structures and market timing from a evolved and evolving 
countries perspective. Findings of the study revealed that countries with well-developed stock 
markets and institution structures recorded the persistent influence of equity market timing on 
firms’ debt-equity mix. However, individual country results are much weaker and insignificant 
for many countries suggesting that stock market and institutional environment in many 
developing countries are not well developed and this impacted  on the results of the study in 
circumstances where the market timing persistent effect was not confirmed. 
In Kenya, Ater, (2017b) reviewed the existing literature on the relationship between capital 
structure and market timing theory from an emerging markets perspective. Reviewed empirical 
studies revealed market timing influences the debt-equity mix of firms and company’s 
performance. Moreover, the market timing effect and magnitude on the debt-equity mix is 
unclearly stated as different studies revealed mixed results. One set of studies revealed that 
market timing creates a distortion company’s capital structures in the market while the other set 
holds that the influence of market timing on capital structure is not persistent.  
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The current study aimed at investigating existence of market timing in security issuance choices 
taken by listed companies in the NSE with a focus on companies that issued corporate debt and 
rights issue between the years 2006 and 2016. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Managers of listed companies act as agents for shareholders. As a result, their actions should be 
directed at shareholder interests in wealth maximization. This objective could be achieved by 
designing an ideal capital structure for a firm. A perception subsist that, there is indeed an 
optimal capital structure, that once put in place and achieved, a firm’s cost of capital would be 
minimized while its market value would be maximized I.-H. Huang, (2014); Kayo & Kimura, 
(2011); Kraus & Litzenberger, (1973). However, an ideal level of capital structure cannot be 
observed since the debt-equity mix is  considered a collective outcome of past efforts to time the 
market as indicated by Baker & Wurgler, (2002); Jensen, (1986); Jensen & Meckling, (1976); 
Modigliani & Miller, (1958),while Kumar & Sharma, (1998) justify nonexistence of a single 
optimal capital structure for all firms or for same firm at all times. 
Ideally, a finance manager should plan an optimum capital structure for his company obtained 
when the market value per share is maximized (Pandey, 2010). In reality, however, the 
determination of an optimum capital structure is a formidable task that has to go beyond theory. 
Planning debt-equity mix of a firm is a highly psychological, complex and qualitative process 
Rao, (1994) since it involves balancing the stakeholders’ expectations (Risk and return) and 
capital requirements of the company.  
The debt-equity choice remains a focus for debate in corporate finance literature Bougatef & 
Chichti, (2010). Previously such a choice was assessed from a tax benefit, financial distress costs 
and agency costs perspective ignoring one important consideration, the timing of the security 
issuance decisions. Baker and Wurgler, (2002) assert that market timing is top on the list factor 
influencing a firms debt or equity use in their capital structure. This implies that it does not 
matter the type of funding firms use fund their investments; they just select the form of financing 
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which seems more valued by the markets. Equity is only issued when it is highly priced by the 
markets and debt is only issued when the prevailing interest rates are low just before they 
increase. Whether firms exploit the markets in their financing policy is still unresolved in 
literature in that prior studies on market timing give results that are mixed and inconclusive. This 
creates a research gap which this study sought to address.  
Firm managers issue debt, equity or hybrid securities in an attempt to ensure that the firms are 
not only adequately stocked with the sources of funding needed but also the used financing 
option is optimized, hence, creating value for the firm. Such decisions are taken in imperfect 
markets where factors influencing the decisions are not only facing constant disruptions but are 
also continuously changing (Payne, Rumore, & Boudreaux, 1994). This means that managers 
need to not only identify the opportune time to utilize a given source of finance but also ensure 
that it is the most optimal for that firm.  
Firms market time by taking advantage of temporary fluctuations in the pricing of their 
securities. This timing behaviour enables firm managers minimize the cost of capital, hence 
maximizing firm value. A well-established view is that firms in evolved markets including the 
US take advantage of capital and money markets fluctuations in making their financing 
decisions. What remains unclear is whether firms in developing financial markets such as Kenya 
follow a similar behaviour. The current study, therefore, sought to investigate the presence of 
market timing in configuration of capital structures of listed firms at the NSE.  
1.3 Objectives of the study 
1.3.1 General objective 




1.3.2 Specific objectives 
1. To investigate presence of market timing in securities issuance by listed companies at the 
NSE. 
2. To analyze the association between market timing and capital structures of listed 
companies at the NSE. 
3. To establish finance manager’s views with regard to market timing by the listed 
companies at the NSE. 
1.4 Research questions 
1. Is there evidence to support market timing by listed firms at the NSE? 
2. Is there an association between market timing and capital structures of companies listed 
at the NSE? 
3. What are the finance manager’s views with regard to market timing by the listed 
companies at the NSE? 
1.5 Scope of the study 
Focus of current study is 21 companies listed on the NSE that raised capital through rights issue 
and corporate debt between the periods 2006 to 2016. Appendix 3 shows the list of companies 
studied. This study period was chosen because it is during that time that most rights offerings 
and corporate debt issues took place at the NSE. 21 rights issues and 27 corporate debts were 
issued at the NSE in the period under review. 
1.6 Justification for the study 
This was aimed at providing the motivation behind the research being conducted as well as the 




Firms exist to maximize wealth for the owners. In their attempt to increase the owners’ wealth 
and reduce the cost of capital, firm managers need to identify windows of opportunities for 
financing where their securities are overvalued or under-priced due to irrational investors and 
capitalize on these. 
1.6.2 Shareholders and investors 
Where SEOs sell overvalued shares through timing, then wealth is handed over from 
stockholders purchasing the SEO to current stockholders who do not partake in such offerings. 
Stockholders who trade in stocks when SEO are floated neither gain nor lose from the equity 
market timing. Debt helps to position corporate executives expectations in line with those of 
stock and debt holders since interest and principal are periodic payments which if not met a 
company may face bankruptcy or financial distress. This study informed current shareholders of 
listed firms to know whether they gain, lose or remain indifferent due to market timing of 
security issuances by companies they have invested in. Varying investor expectations, structures 
and regulations exist in the Kenyan capital market. Findings from the study assisted investors 
understand firm's motives of issuing securities that constitute capital structures of companies 
they invest in and hence enable them to make rational investment decisions. 
1.6.3 Regulators  
CMA and CBK who are the stock market regulator and money market regulators in Kenya 
respectively, can use information from this study to formulate policies governing issuance of 
securities by listed companies and also in formulating investors and /shareholder protection 
policies. Share repurchase is not legalized in Kenya even though the Revised Companies Act of 
2015 contains provisions which allow listed companies to repurchase shares through NSE. The 
government can use findings from the study to determine whether it is worthwhile to legalize 
share repurchase by firms listed at the NSE or not. 
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1.6.4 Academicians and Scholars 
The study aims at shedding light as to whether managers time the market during formation of 
capital structures for Kenyan listed companies. It will build on the existing literature on capital 
structures of quoted firms at the NSE. It will add to the literature on optimal capital structure by 
explaining if firms listed at the NSE have an ideal capital structure or not. This study will also 







A detailed account of reviewed literature is advanced in this chapter, with the subsections 
structured as follows: 2.2 Theoretical Review; 2.3 Empirical Review; 2.4 Conceptual 
Framework; 2.5 Research Gap and; 2.6 Summary of the chapter on literature review. 
2.2 Theoretical Review on market timing and capital structure 
This part covers theories that the study is anchored on. Three major theories guide financing 
decisions of firms; market timing Baker & Wurgler, (2002), pecking order and trade-off theory. 
The irrelevance theory Modigliani & Miller, (1958) describe the capital structure of a firm.  
2.2.1 Market Timing Theory  
A theory developed by Baker & Wurgler,(2002) in their research on capital structure  and market 
timing. It asserts that firms plan their security issuance decisions to tap into the prevailing market 
conditions. New shares are only issued when existing share prices are considered to be priced at 
a premium by the market otherwise debt is preferred (Baker & Wurgler, 2002). Variability of 
share prices and interest rates influence a company’s debt-equity mix. Two viewpoints exist with 
regards to equity market timing that result to comparable capital structure dynamics.  
The first view presupposes existence of rational economic agents. The assumption made is that 
companies offer equity following a reduction in information asymmetry that subsists between 
company executives and shareholders of a firm achieved mainly through a positive information 
release. The reduction in information asymmetry corresponds with a run up in stock prices 




The second view presumes that economic decision makers  have irrational behaviour, Baker & 
Wurgler, (2002) that results in time-varying mispricing of a firm's share. Corporate executives in 
these firms will then issue equity owing their belief that equity is lowly priced by market and 
issue debt when they notice equity to be highly priced by market (Baker & Wurgler, 
2002).Market inefficiency is not a prerequisite for this version of market timing nor does it 
expect managers to successfully forecast share returns. It presumes that timing the market is a 
skill manager's believe they can execute successfully. 
The theory postulates that corporate executives time the market when issuing securities Baker & 
Wurgler, (2002); Korajczyk, Lucas, & McDonald, (1991); Lucas & McDonald, (1990). 
Consistent with pecking order, market timing theory is premised on presence of information gap 
between investors and managers. The theory asserts that a company’s choice to offer equity 
relies on current valuation of its shares and stock market performance. Corporations issue equity 
when they deem company’s shares are  presently overpriced by market or else, debt is issued 
(Barclay & Smith, 2005). Issuance of debt signals that a company’s stock is under-priced (Spiess 
& Affleck-Graves, 1999). Debt issuance mainly happens in cases where interest rates are low 
just before they increase. 
Support for this theory is however mixed. Several studies Graham & Harvey, (2001); Bougatef 
& Chichti, (2010); Bancel & Mittoo, (2004); Elliott et al., (2004); Jenter, (2005), validate the 
market timing theory by confirming that securities overvaluation drives issuance decisions. Other 
sets of literature demonstrate that companies that finance their investments through rights issue, 
IPOs and convertible debt face poor post-issuance performance; Loughran, Ritter, & Rydqvist, 
(1994); Ritter, (1991); Spiess & Affleck-Graves, (1995); Loughran & Ritter, (1995); Spiess & 
Affleck-Graves, (1999). These findings are consistent with cases where firms leverage from 
opening windows for financing opportunities when their securities are overvalued and issue such 
securities.  
Various authors, Alti, (2006);  Brendea, (2012);Bruinshoofd & de Haan, (2012); Leary & 
Roberts, (2005): Flannery & Rangan, (2006); De Bie & De Haan, (2007); Altı & Sulaeman, 
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(2012); Vallandro, Zani, & Silva,(2014b); Mahajan & Tartaroglu, (2008); Nguyen & Boubaker, 
(2009) stress on non-persistence influence market timing has on capital structures, refuting 
market timing theory in support of pecking order and dynamic trade-off theories. Stock market 
and money market performance and misvaluation of debt or equity do not influence funding 
choices of companies as per pecking order and dynamic trade-off theories.  
This study supported an assumption made in market timing theory that company executives think 
they can exploit opening windows for financing but are unable to instantaneously differentiate 
between mispricing and dynamic asymmetric information versions of market timing. Baker & 
Wurgler, (2002) through their study present proof on the persistent effect that equity market 
timing has on debt-equity mix of a company. They quantify equity market timing as a weighted 
average of external capital requirements over the past few years, where the weights used were 
market to book values of the company. Findings of the study indicate that leverage variations are 
strongly positively related to this market timing measure, hence, Baker and Wurgler,(2002) draw 
conclusions that a company's equity-debt mix is a collective result of past efforts to exploit the 
equity market.  
Consistent with the Baker and Wurgler, (2002) paper, MBR was employed to capture the firm 
valuation by the market. The market timing proposition envisages equity issuers to have higher 
MB than debt issuers. Chang, Hilary, Shih, & Tam, (2010); Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, & 
Teoh, (2006) state that MB and associated variables such as pre-issue stock returns can be used 
to show managerial skills and growth opportunities. To differentiate market timing from other 
explanations, this study additionally looked at stocks performance through an analysis of stock 
returns during the announcement period and long run stock returns post the announcement of a 
security issuance decision since short-term market reactions may inadequately reflect full extent 
of the pre-announcement market valuation of issuers. Market timing maintains that companies 
should issue stock (debt) when they are highly priced (lowly priced). As the market corrects 
itself, the pre-announcement misvaluation following the issuance announcement will lead to post 
announcement stock returns that are lower (higher) for high MB (low MB) firms. 
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Companies that issue equity are assumed to be growth firms. Previous studies stipulate that these 
firms experience a deterioration of share prices and operating performance after such security 
issues Loughran & Ritter, (1997); McLaughlin, Safieddine, & Vasudevan, (1996); Spiess & 
Affleck-Graves, (1999). This decline is attributed to market timing and free cash flow hypothesis 
considering such issues often coincide with a share price run-up of issuing firms.  
Market timing hypothesis states that company’s time equity issuance to intervals of improved 
market performance. This timing behaviour is attributed to the costs of adverse selection as 
advocated for by the pecking order theory. Market performance is measured using return of the 
overall market. This study employed the NSE 20 share index returns to measure market 
performance. 
2.2.2 The Trade-Off Theory 
It states that the ideal debt ratio of a company is established through a compromise between cost 
and benefits of borrowing holding the company’s assets and investment plans constant. When 
Modigliani and Miller, (1963) incorporated corporation tax to the original irrelevance theory, an 
interest tax shield benefit was created for firms using debt. These firms balanced their debt and 
equity levels by compromising between the present value of interest tax shields and the cost of 
bankruptcy or financial distress. As long as no adjustments costs were connected to changes in 
capital structure, existing debt-equity mix remained ideal hence maximizing firm value (Myers, 
1984).  
 
Assimilating agency costs to the static trade-off theory implies companies establish debt-equity 
mix by compromising tax debt shield against agency cost of equity. According to the trade-off 
theory, an ideal debt-equity mix exists for firms settled through equity and leverage ratios. If 
existing leverage ratios differ from the optimum, firms then adapt their financing behaviours’ in 
an attempt to get the leverage ratio back to the ideal level. Static trade-off theory envisages an 
optimum debt ratio for firms settled on through balancing costs and benefits of debt versus 
equity. Myers, (1977) demonstrated that a cost of debt is when an overly leveraged company is 
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forced to forego worthwhile investment projects and consequently, companies  with worthwhile 
growth prospects ought to set lower leverage ratios.  
High MBRs are frequently linked with favourable growth prospects. Trade-off theory, therefore, 
forecasts firms with high MBRs offer equity and have lower observed debt ratios. The relevance 
of the trade-off theory is that it describes how companies are funded partly with debt and partly 
with equity. Additionally, corporations determine the form and the amount of financing to utilize 
by trading off the costs and gains of both debt and equity.  
2.2.3 The Pecking Order Theory 
This theory is established on the assumption that an information gap exists between corporate 
executives and its investors. Myers & Majluf, (1984) argued that due to information gap with 
regard to firm value, a high possibility exists that equity will be incorrectly by the market.  
Myers & Majluf, (1984) assert firms establish preference conditions with regard to their 
financing such that internal finance is preferred over outside finance, secure debt is preferred 
over risky debt and convertibles, and equity is used when no other source is available to the firm. 
Myers, (1984) argue that an ideal capital structure is at all times not easy to describe given that 
equity is the first and the last in the hierarchy of finances. Internally generated finances bear no 
issuance expenses and need no revelation of the firm’s proprietary financial information such as 
the firm’s prospective investment chances and benefits anticipated to arise to the firm from 
making such investments. This indicates why firm growth should be considered as a factor 
influencing a firm’s capital structure.  
Alternative ways of financing a company are linked with differing levels of financing costs 
(Myers, 1984). Consequently, firms establish a financing hierarchy to be followed, where 
internal funds are first utilised, then debt financing and equity finances is utilised when no other 
source is available for the firm. The influence of pecking order depends on the equity valuation 
by market, where if a company's stocks are overrated, the motivation to offer highly valued 
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equity may override any effect suggested by the theory. Particularly if company stock is highly 
priced, it may decide equity instead of debt for a financially unconstrained firm as expected. 
Pecking order theory considers MBR to be a measure of investment prospects. Putting this 
explanation into scrutiny, Myers, (1984); Fama & French, (2002) believe a coexisting 
association between the MBR and the debt-equity mix of a firm would be complicated to resolve 
with the pecking order model. In circumstances where high past MBR match with high past 
investment prospects, such periods tend to push leverage to low levels. 
The theory is premised on the presence of an information gap where insiders are more informed 
about the company risks, prospects and value than outside investors. Presence of information gap 
determines whether firms will utilise in-house funding or outside funding and whether they will 
choose debt or equity. Presence of information gap support the issue of debt over equity since 
debt issuance indicates a company management belief on the future prospects of the company’s 
investments and that the share is currently lowly valued (where the share price is highly valued 
equity issuance will be favoured). 
It is also based on the assumption that the trade-off theory costs and benefits are secondly ranked 
in importance when contrasted with the expenses incurred in offering new securities when 
information gaps exist. Tangible assets compared to intangible assets have less information 
asymmetry and have greater value when a company falls into bankruptcy. This signifies that 
tangibility of assets is a factor that should be put into consideration in capital structure choice of 
a firm. 
This theory postulates that firms should utilised in-house generated funds which may be 
insufficient for growth. The next available option for expansion is debt financing implying 
growth firms will have  high leverage levels Zeitun & Tian, (2014). Firm growth should 
therefore be considered as a factor influencing capital structure of a firm. 
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2.2.4 The ‘Irrelevance’ Theory  
It is the cornerstone of the present theory of capital structure. Modigliani and Miller, (1958) 
demonstrated that when taxes, information gap, transaction costs and bankruptcy costs are not 
present and assuming persons and firms can loan using a similar interest rate, firm value will be 
self-reliant of its financial structure. Modigliani & Miller, (1958) argue profitability of a firm’s 
assets determine its value as opposed to how its assets have been funded using debt or equity. 
They also demonstrate that the dividend policy adopted by a firm is not relevant in determining 
its value. 
 Modigliani and Miller, (1958) assert a company cannot grow its worth through use of debt. 
Capital structure irrelevance propositions come in two essentially diverse forms. The classic 
arbitrage-based irrelevance propositions offer surroundings in which investors’ arbitrage 
maintains firm value to be autonomous of its leverage.  
The second irrelevance proposition concludes that given a company’s investment strategy, the 
dividend pay-out policy it follows does not influence the prevailing valuation of a stock and the 
wealth it offers its stockholders(Miller & Modigliani, 1961). According to this theory, firm value 
is influenced by assets profitability as opposed to the way the assets are funded by use of debt or 
equity. A profitable firm might keep more of its earnings resulting to lower leverage levels 
according to pecking order theory. A similar result can achieved through indifferent preservation 
of profits in perfect markets, Modigliani & Miller, (1958) or from making use of interest tax 
shield in the more realistic tax environment (Modigliani & Miller, 1963). Hence, the profitability 
of a firm should be considered as a capital structure determinant.  
Profitable firms face more idle cash problems which can be resolved by increasing the amount of 
leverage the firm holds. Managers of these firms may sub optimally use idle cash or for personal 
gain like in empire building and perquisites consumption instead of investing in opportunities 
aimed at shareholder wealth maximization. According to Jensen, (1986), in the agency theory, a 
solution to this problem can be achieved through growing of ownership percentage of the 
19 
 
corporate executives or by expanding debt in capital structure, hence minimizing the amount of 
idle cash available to corporate executives. Leverage is thus used as a mechanism to streamline 
corporate executive’s interests with those of stockholders since bankruptcy is costly for 
management. This implies how significant liquidity is as a factor influencing capital structure. 
2.3 Empirical review of market timing, capital structure and their relationship. 
This section examines and discusses the work and findings of different scholars in relation to the 
objectives of this research. This section was analyzed as per the research objectives. The first 
objective of the study sought to examine presence of market timing in securities issuance by 
listed firms at the NSE. While the second objective analyzed whether any relationship existed 
between market timing and capital structures of listed firms and the third objective aimed at 
assessing the manager’s opinions on market timing. 
2.3.1 Presence of Market timing 
First objective of the study sought to examine presence of market timing in securities issuance by 
listed companies at the NSE. Market timing enables firms to minimize cost of capital while 
maximizing shareholder value. If managers of listed firms at the NSE market time their securities 
issuance this would imply no optimal capital structures for these firms as companies would 
choose the type of financing that is overvalued by the market. Observed capital structures would 
thus be the collective product of past efforts in timing the financial markets. In the reviewed 
literature market timing of security issuance decision has been analyzed from the following 
perspectives whose presence is taken to signify attempts by corporate executives to exploit 
chances of market timing; 
2.3.1.1 High current market valuations as compared to book and past market valuations 
In the reviewed literature, the timing of equity issues has been analyzed through the inclination 
of companies to offer equity when they are highly priced by the markets, a result frequently 
understood as proof of market exploitation efforts. Taggart, (1977) examined the security 
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issuance decisions and the relationship that existed between them and measures of ideal capital 
structures and debt capacity. In the study, an integrated model of corporate funding models was 
developed; through which evidence was found to support the perception that variations in market 
values of equity and debt were essential elements influencing US companies security issuance 
decisions. 
Coherent with the findings of this study, Marsh, (1982) sampled 748 all cash offers of equity and 
quoted debt by the UK listed firms between 1959 and 1970  to investigate how these companies 
made the debt-equity choice. Independent variables used in this study included historical 
averages, risk, company size and asset configuration which were considered to be significant 
determinants of debt ratios and market conditions which were used to proxy for short term 
timing considerations in securities issuance. In this study, a descriptive model of the choice 
between equity and debt was advanced. Results from this study indicated that history of security 
prices as well as prevailing market conditions impacted the decision to issue debt or equity. 
Further evidence suggested firms appeared to select the financing instrument to use with target 
levels to be achieved in mind in as far as long run and short run debt ratios are concerned in 
proportion to overall debt of the firm.  
Agreeing with these results is a study by Elliott et al., (2008) who examined market timing and 
the debt-equity choice in the US. Sampling 9,172 non-financial firms divided into 3,781 public 
seasoned equity and 5,391 non-convertible debt offerings during the period 1980-1999 and 
utilizing an earnings-based valuation model which enabled them to distinguish between equity 
misvaluation from growth alternatives and time-varying adverse selection; thus, circumventing 
multiple interpretations of MBR. Results from the study indicated that companies whose shares 
are  overvalued and whose market valuation exceeds the intrinsic valuation as generated by the 
residual income model had a high probability of offering equity, while the fairly valued or 
undervalued, were more likely to issue debt. They concluded that the mispricing of equity by the 
market plays an essential, if not commanding role in the security issuance decision. 
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Further evidence on the importance of overvaluation when companies are making financing 
decisions is echoed by Siagian & Saad, (2011) in their study of Indonesian firms. The study 
comprised of 68 manufacturing companies for the period 1994 to 2008, they presented three 
arguments about the effectiveness of market timing theory. First, when current market values are 
high as well as when market value of the past is high managers tend to offer equity in lieu of 
debt. Secondly, through an analysis of estimated earnings prospects, high optimism and high 
enthusiasm of investors will drive companies to sell equity. Thirdly, companies with high growth 
utilize market timing theory in making their financing decisions since at this stage the company 
attracts a lot of market sentiment. These arguments indicate how important overvaluation of a 
company stock is when it sells its stake in the market. 
In accord with the outcomes of the  above studies, Bougatef and Chichti, (2010) used Tunisian 
and French listed companies to examine the significance of market timing considerations on the 
debt-equity choice. Outcomes of study indicated that, high market valuations and improvement 
in market performance triggered firms to issue equity which concurs with the market timing 
theory. This makes leverage levels in these firms to become lower in the short run and this effect 
lasted for more than eight years. 
2.3.1.2 Interest rates  
Firms that issue long term debt tend to make such issues when rates of interest are at their 
minimum, prior to their increase. Periods of low rates of interest may be viewed by managers as 
favourable times to issue debt with the aim of acquiring capital before interest rates increase 
which may be viewed as efforts to exploit money markets. Henderson et al., (2006) sampled 
195,375 security issues for the period 1990-2001 in several world markets; they established a 
negative association between quantity of debt issued and level of interest rates in all countries 
they studied. This relation was statistically significant in most of the cases. They concluded that 
firms in these countries appear to time both their long- and short-term bond issues to correspond 
with low contemporaneous rates.  
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This results collaborate survey evidence from US and Canadian firms Graham & Harvey, (2001) 
and from European firms Bancel & Mittoo, (2004) in which CFOs and managers claim that when 
making debt issuance decisions they actively attempt to exploit the debt market by picking  
favourable moments to make such issues when interest rates are quite low.  
Further conformity of this evidence is found in a study by Baker, Stein, & Wurgler, (2003) who 
established forwarding-looking market timing in the debt market. Thus, when managers are 
forecasting future interest rates with an expectation of them going down they will offer short-run 
debt whereas when interest rates are expected to increase long-term debt is offered. Baker, Stein, 
et al., (2003) established that debt market condition considerations including real short-term rates 
of interest, inflation and term structure drive the share of long term debt at the aggregate market 
level. 
Contradicting these studies is a study by Barry, Mann, Mihov, and Rodriguez, (2005) who 
sampled 14,000 debt offerings between 1970 to 2001 on US firms. This allowed them to study 
issues that could not be tested with macroeconomic data. They found proof of backward-looking 
market timing whereby firms offer higher levels of debt for investment spending and equity 
when rates of interest are low.  
2.3.1.3 Pre and post-issuance stock returns performance of firms 
Market timing is also detected using pre and post-issuance stock returns of firms that raise 
capital through IPOS, SEOS and debt. Findings from these studies indicate that the performance 
of these firms deteriorates after such issues which are consistent with market timing. In a study 
of US companies that went public in the period from  1974 to 1982, (Ritter, 1991) used a sample 
of 1,526 IPOs and utilized two measures namely the CAR and the 3-year buy and hold returns to 
evaluate long-term performance of Initial public offerings and a set of similar firms. Findings 
from this study indicated substantial poor performance of the offering companies when 
compared to that of a sample of similar firms starting from the first public trading day up to three 
years after the IPO. Considerable variation in the underperformance was established when the 
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stock returns were compared on a year-to-year basis and when compared across industries with 
companies that issued their IPOS during high-volume years doing the worst. They concluded that 
these patterns are exhibited by IPO markets in which investors are occasionally overly confident 
about the earnings prospects of young growing firms, and in markets where companies exploit 
"opening windows of opportunity for financing” when there is an overvaluation of their share 
prices by the market. 
Conforming findings are established in a study which sampled 1,247 primary SEOs, 620 by 
NASDAQ-quoted companies and 627 by NYSE- and Amex-quoted companies in the U.S 
between 1975-1989 by Spiess and Affleck-Graves, (1995). Findings from the study indicate that 
post-offering performance experienced by SEOs firms can be compared to that of IPO issuing 
firms. The median return for SEO firms in the five years post the offering is 10.0% whereas 
similar size, same industry non-issuing firms record a median 5-year return of 42.3%.This 
underperformance persists even when the firms are matched on the basis of MBR and size as 
opposed to the industry and size classification. These findings imply that corporate executives 
exploit overvaluation in both the IPO and SEO markets to issue equity. 
In line with the above studies outcomes is a study by Altı and Sulaeman, (2012) who sought to 
establish when high share returns prompt issuance of equity. Using a sample of 2,614 SEOs 
announcements and 2,203 completed SEOs in the US; they show that firms timed their securities 
to periods of high stock returns, conditional on such issues being accompanied by high levels of 
demand by institutional investors.  
Further underperformance of stocks in firms making security issuance is also confirmed in the 
case of companies issuing debt. Spiess & Affleck-Graves, (1999) examined stock returns long 
term performance after debt issues in the US. This study used a sample consisting of 392 straight 
debt offerings and 400 convertible debt issues between 1975 and 1989. Results from the 392 
straight debt issuers indicated that the median sample company underperformed a similar size 
and MBR matched firm by 19% in the 5 years after the debt issue while for the 400 convertible 
debt issuers a median company recorded poor performance when compared to its matched 
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counterpart by 20% in the 5 years post the convertible debt issue whereas the average holding-
period return for studied companies is 37% lower than the mean for the matched control 
companies.  
Results from this study verify that convertible debt issues pass on negative information to the 
market, with an under-reaction when the announcement is made. Results of the study propose 
that debt issues just like equity issues signal firm overvaluation. Conclusions from this study 
indicate that highly valued companies can issue security of any type and the underperformance 
of stocks and operating performance points out to firm’s that take advantage of opening windows 
for financing when their securities are overvalued by the market. 
2.3.1.4 Market activity or market performance 
Market activity can also be used to examine market timing. The performance of the capital and 
money markets influences the debt-equity choice made by firms. Doukas et al., (2011) examined 
motivations of debt offering during hot-debt market periods and its influence on the capital 
structure. Sampling 6,110 firm-annual debt issues, made up of all new, nonconvertible, public 
bond offerings from 1970 to 2006 in the US markets, the study established that, when the 
conditions prevailing in the capital market were perceived as conducive an indicator of market 
timing, and adverse selection costs of equity (high information gap in equity) were vital 
considerations that influenced certain companies to offer high levels of debt in hot-than in the 
cold-debt market periods. Further confirmations from this study indicate that when equity was 
unfavourable companies responded by issuing debt which is subject to less information 
asymmetry. The influence of hot-debt issuance on debt funding is found to be significant when 
alternative hot-market measures are used and controlling for other effects and this impact lasted 
for more than 5 years post the hot debt issuance.  
Consistent findings were established in a study by Lucas and McDonald, (1990) who studied 549 
SEO by NYSE/AMEX industrial companies during the period from 1974 to 1983. Using an 
information-theoretic, infinite horizon model of the equity issuance choice, they posit that equity 
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issuances are preceded by on average an abnormal positive share return and an abnormal rise in  
market which is consistent with market timing theory. Agreeing with these results is a study by 
Marsh, (1982) who sampled  748 all cash issues of equity and quoted debt made by  UK quoted 
companies between 1959 and 1970 to investigate how these companies made their debt-equity 
choice. Results from this study indicate that companies are heavily influenced by market 
conditions and  past history of security prices in choosing between equity and debt.  
2.3.1.5 Market to book ratio 
Other studies including Baker and Wurgler, (2002); Hovakimian, (2006) focused on  MBR to 
capture timing attempts where market timers were identified as companies that raise capital at 
high market valuations. Market timing hypothesis predicts equity issuers to have higher MB than 
debt issuers. In their study of 2,839 IPO event observations by US firms in the period from 1968 
to 1999, Baker & Wurgler, (2002) established that companies with high levels of leverage raised 
capital when their MB values were high and companies with low levels of leverage are those that 
raised capital when their MB ratios were low. Logical with these findings is a study by 
Hovakimian, (2006) whose findings imply that equity offerings are timed to periods when 
MBRS are high. The study sampled 56,259 U.S firms covering the duration from 1983 to 2002 
and regression analysis to investigate market timing. Findings from this study indicated that the 
higher the weighted average of past MBR for a firm was, the higher the probability of the firm 
issuing equity in the current period and the lower the weighted average of past MBRs the higher 
the possibility that debt would be issued in the current period.   
2.3.2 The debt-equity choice of a firm 
The decision to issue debt or equity for a firm is influenced by several factors which are 
considered essential determinants of capital structure. These factors include; firm profitability, 
firm growth, tangibility of assets, risk, firm size, liquidity among others. Various studies have 
investigated these factors that influence capital structure. Gathogo & Ragui, (2014) utilised a 
panel regression model sampling 200 consisting of quoted companies, unquoted firms and small 
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and medium enterprises covering the period 2000 to 2010 with an aim of finding out what 
determined capital structures of these companies. Findings from this study demonstrated that 
firm size, asset growth, profitability, liquidity and cost of debt had a positive effect on  capital 
structure of a company whereas risk of business and industry type were not strongly correlated to 
capital structure of a firm. Modified Pecking Order theory was confirmed by this study. 
Ngugi, (2008) evaluated capital structure funding behaviour of 22 firms trading on the NSE for 
the period starting 1991 to 1999. Reduced form equations derived from static trade-off model 
and pecking order hypotheses were derived in this study, estimated and tested using panel data 
techniques. A pecking order model with an adjustment process was confirmed by this study. 
Further findings indicated that Kenyan listed firms prefer to fund their investments with short-
term debt and bank overdrafts despite the uncertainty and financial risk associated with this 
mode of financing and these resulted in a reduction in a given firm’s value. The study established 
major determinants of capital financing behaviour for Kenyan listed firms to  consist of non-debt 
tax shields, local capital market infrastructure and information asymmetries. Ater, (2017a) used a 
cross-sectional survey research design and adopted the weighted least squares regression 
technique to sample 36 non-financial listed companies at the NSE covering the period between 
2011 through to 2015. Findings from this study indicated a statistically significant association 
between capital structure and firm value for non-financial listed companies on the NSE. In the 
study long term debt was found positively influence firm value in a similar way like equity 
capital.  
The debt-equity choice of a firm is influence by the following factors which are considered 
important determinants of capital structure; 
2.3.2.1 Firm size 
Two contradicting views exist on the association between firm size and leverage. As per the 
trade-off theory, larger companies are well diversified, have stable cash flows and their 
probability of bankruptcy less as compared to small smaller. Therefore, large companies favour 
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debt to equity funding (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Marsh, (1982) assert owing to high level of fixed 
assets, stable cash flows, economies of scale and creditworthiness, large companies have 
superior negotiating authority over lenders and can borrow at relatively lower rates. Rajan and 
Zingales, (1995) in a study of G-7 countries noted that large companies tend to be more 
diversified and hence they have a lower probability of default. This argument concurs with  
predictions of trade-off theory which proposes that large companies should borrow more since 
they are well diversified, less prone to bankruptcy with relatively lower bankruptcy costs. In 
addition, large firms have lower agency costs such as relatively lower monitoring costs due to 
their less volatile cash flow and easy access to capital markets. Thus, large firms are expected to 
hold more debt in their capital structure than equity, hence, a positive relationship between size 
and leverage in a firm. 
Contradicting this view, pecking order theory suggests a negative relationship between firm size 
and leverage since large firms have less information gaps which reduces chances of their equity 
being mispriced by market which motivates large firms to finance using equity hence a negative 
association between firm size and leverage. In this study, firm size is expected to be negatively 
correlated with leverage. 
2.3.2.2 Tangibility of assets 
Capital structure theories assert the debt-equity mix choice made by a firm is influenced by the 
type of assets it owns. Trade-off and pecking order theory contradict one another on whether 
tangible assets have a positive or negative influence on capital structure. Trade-off theory 
envisages positive association, Modigliani & Miller, (1963) whereas pecking order, Myers & 
Majluf, (1984) forecasts negative association.  Tangible assets offer high collateral value relative 
to intangible assets; they also have a high liquidation value which serves as security for debt and 
helps in reducing monitoring costs thereby enhancing a company’s debt capacity. Tangible assets 
reduce the cost of financial distress. However, if tangible assets cannot be easily converted into 
cash firms may have a lower debt capacity. Prior literature suggest a positive association 
between tangibility and leverage Jensen & Meckling, (1976); Rajan & Zingales, (1995). Agency 
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theory on the other hand, envisages a negative association between leverage and tangibility of 
assets. A positive association is expected between tangibility of assets and leverage in the current 
study. 
2.3.2.3 Profitability 
Conflicting predictions exist from theory on influence profitability has on leverage. A negative 
association between profitability and leverage is envisaged in pecking order theory, Myers & 
Majluf, (1984) since firms that are profitable have the ability to generate internal funds and 
would therefore prefer to finance with internally generated funds. Trade off theory on the other 
hand proposes the association to be positive since profitability should be interpreted as a 
indication of company performance- firms ability to repay their debts. Additionally, in trade-off 
theory, agency costs, taxes and bankruptcy costs drive more profitable companies towards 
elevated leverage levels. Profitability and leverage are expected to have a negative relationship in 
the study. 
2.3.2.4 Liquidity 
Due to their ability to meet contractual obligations as they fall due, companies with high liquidity 
ratios are expected to borrow more as per trade-off theory which forecast a positive association 
between liquidity and leverage. On the flip side, pecking order theory forecasts a negative 
association between leverage and liquidity reason being very liquid companies opt to source 
funds internally for new investments. In the study, a negative association is expected between 
liquidity and leverage. 
2.3.2.5 Firm growth 
Assets that add value to a company are classified as growth opportunities. Rajan & Zingales, 
(1995) assert that companies on a growing trajectory are less likely to issue debt in the first 
instance, and therefore leverage is expected to be negatively related to growth opportunities. 
Myers & Majluf, (1984); Fama & French, (2002); Jensen & Meckling, (1976) argue that owing 
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to high chances of passing up profitable investment opportunities by highly levered firms, 
companies with high future growth opportunities should as a priority consider more of equity 
financing, given that such investments in effect move wealth from shareholders to debt holders 
(G. Huang & Song, 2006). For that reason, a negative association is expected between growth 
opportunities and leverage. As MBR is used as a proxy for growth opportunities, Rajan & 
Zingales, (1995), a further reason to expect a negative association is that firms with high MBRs 
are exposed to higher financial distress costs which will drive them to issue equity. A number of 
empirical studies corroborate the negative relation, Rajan & Zingales, (1995) whereas other 
studies confirm a positive association between growth opportunities and leverage (G. Huang & 
Song, 2006). 
2.3.2.6 Risk 
Debt is cheaper than equity as a result of tax shield on interest payments. Debt however, puts 
pressure on a firm since interest and principal are obligatory payments which if not settled a firm 
risks financial distress (Ross, Westerfield, & Jaffe, 2006). Owing to agency and bankruptcy 
costs, firms may fail to exploit tax benefits of fully financing their investments using debt as 
recommended for by trade off theory. A firm’s motivation to reduce its debt levels would be 
higher if it is exposed to such costs. A company’s operating risk influences a firm’s vulnerability 
to these costs. This is because the higher the volatility of a company’s earnings stream, the 
greater its probability of failing to honour its obligations as they fall due and hence being 
exposed to such costs. a positive relationship is expected between risk and leverage in the study. 
2.3.2.7 Information asymmetries 
Market timing theory is premised on assumption of information gap between corporate 
executives and investors in those firms. Corporate executives exploit equity markets based on 
private information they have about the future value of the firm or exploit debt markets based on 
public information such as term spread or predictable excess bond returns, Bruinshoofd & de 
Haan, (2012)  implying that equity is subject to more information asymmetry compared to debt. 
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Equity market timing is facilitated by presence of low information gap in equities market 
signifying a negative relationship between information asymmetry and leverage. On the flip side, 
investors turn to debt markets owing to high levels of information asymmetry in the equities 
market, implying a positive relation between leverage and information asymmetry. In this study, 
both relationships are expected to be confirmed owing to both debt and equity issues being 
studied. 
2.3.2.8 Non-debt tax shield 
It is a measure of amount of earnings that are not subject to tax due to non-debt tax shield that a 
firm has. Non-debt tax shield can be decomposed into investment tax credits and depreciation. 
Lower debt ratios are observed for companies with higher non-debt tax shield since it lowers 
income left to shelter the firm using debt interest. A negative relation between leverage and non-
debt tax shield is expected in this study.  
2.3.2.9 Local capital market infrastructure 
Capital market conditions do not remain same forever. Depending on the economy there may be 
a boom while at other times there may be depression. Sometimes capital market infrastructure is 
enabling while at other times it is limiting. If there is depression in the market as well as 
pessimistic business conditions, a company should not issue equity since investors would prefer 
safety. In the current study, a positive relationship is expected between local capital market 
infrastructure and leverage. 
 2.3.3 Relationship between market timing and capital structure 
The second objective of the study sought to examine association that existed if any between 
market timing and capital structure of listed firms at the NSE. Market timing is a theory of the 
manner in which firms and corporations in the economy resolve to fund their investments using 
debt or equity instruments. Baker & Wurgler, (2002) assert that market timing is a top on the list 
factor corporations put into consideration when issuing debt or equity. This suggests that firms 
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select type of funding that seems highly valued by financial markets, they care less whether they 
finance with debt or equity. 
A strongly negative relationship is established between leverage and their market timing measure 
by reviewed studies on relationship between market timing and capital structure. Baker & 
Wurgler, (2002) study on persistent influence market timing has on capital structures for US 
firms can be considered to be the starting point of a wide range of research in this area of capital 
structure. Majority of studies on market timing and capital structure perhaps, can be considered 
as reactions to Baker & Wurgler, (2002) findings that market timing influence on capital 
structure is persistent, lasting more than 10 years. Using a sample of 2,839 IPO event 
observations on US firms for the period from1968 to 1999, they established that firms that raised 
capital when their market valuations were high as measured by MBR had low leverage whereas 
are those that raised funds when their market valuations were low. Ordinary least squares 
regression model was used to achieve these results where leverage was the response variable and 
the "external finance weighted-average" MBR was the predictor variable. Their explanatory 
variable was a weighted mean of a firm's past MBRs which assumed high values for firms that 
issued equity(debt) when their MBRs were high (low). 
Findings from the study established that leverage had a strong negative relationship to the 
historical market valuations measure. An economically significant and statistically robust effect 
of past market valuations was established by the study which led to the conclusions that 
variations in market valuations had large effects on capital structure that persist for at least a 
decade. As a result, they defined capital structure of a company as the collective product of past 
efforts to exploit the equity market.  
Baker & Wurgler, (2002) argued that their findings could not be described using traditional 
financing theories. Consequently, they developed market timing theory in which an optimal 
capital structure does not exist. According to the theory, the target adjustment speed for capital 
structures is zero given they do not rebalance their debt and equity positions. 
Over/undervaluation of securities is sole determinant of corporate financing decisions. Agency 
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costs, non-debt tax shield, time-varying adverse selection cost and interest tax shields assume no 
role in security issuance decisions according to this theory.   
Two criticisms against the work of Baker & Wurgler, (2002) have been identified. First, 
Hovakimian, (2006) in a study of US companies re-evaluated Baker & Wurgler,(2002) 
conclusions on firm behaviour and capital structure policy. They used the same sample size and 
methodology used by Baker & Wurgler, (2002) with a few changes on their measures. Their 
work questioned Baker & Wurgler, (2002) conclusion that “capital structure is the collective 
product of past efforts of timing the markets” as no significant proof was found to support 
market timing theory for debt issues and debt reduction in firm’s debt-equity choices in the 
study. Further findings from this study indicated that although equity transactions may be 
conducted in such a manner and aimed at timing conditions prevailing in the equity market, their 
effect was not significant and resilient on capital structure. The study established that MBR 
impact reveals growth opportunities of firms as opposed to equity market timing.   
The second problem with market timing arose from inappropriate use of historical cost MBR to 
represent a company's market timing efforts. Even though this concern was highlighted by Baker 
& Wurgler, (2002) in their study, some researchers assert that they trust their conclusions 
conform to equity mispricing in the presence of irrational investors or corporate executives; 
alternate explanations exist for this ratio. Use of MBR to examine existence of market timing has 
so far been overwhelmed by difficulties resulting from multiple interpretations of what the ratio 
captures including information asymmetry, growth opportunities, debt overhang problems, 
current state of economy and capital intensiveness of a firms technology. Alti, (2006); Elliott et 
al., (2004) and Hovakimian, (2006) argued that, Baker & Wurgler, (2002) findings were not as a 
result of equity market timing but were mainly as a result of the presence of growth opportunities 
in those firms. Consequently, many studies have opted to use alternative techniques to evaluate 
market timing such as earnings-based valuation model used by Elliott et al., (2008) in their study. 
Contradicting this persistent impact market timing has on leverage is another study by 
Alti,(2006) who studied the persistent influence of market timing on the debt-equity mix. 
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Sampling 2,200 IPOs, 1,891 IPOs issued in high IPO volume months months and 309 IPOs 
offered in low volume IPO months for the period from 1971 to 1999 in the US. The market 
timing measure utilised by the study is high IPO volume market and low IPO volume market 
where a high IPO volume month is described as one that has high number of issuers. He argued 
that, if issuers regarded high IPO volume markets as windows of opportunity with a momentarily 
low cost of equity capital, they responded by offering more equity than is expected. Equally, 
equity offerings would be kept at a minimum in low IPO volume markets sine market conditions 
were regarded as less favourable. Results from this study exhibited that market timing depressed 
leverage in the very short term and this adverse effect of market timing on leverage had very low 
persistence. This persistent influence of market timing on capital structure totally disappeared 
two years post the IPO event. Conclusions from this study showed that market timing is essential 
in influencing the financing activity of a firm.  
Conforming to the study conducted by Alti,(2006) is a study of Dutch quoted company’s by De 
Bie & De Haan, (2007) who studied market timing and capital structures using an unbalanced 
panel of 135 non-financial firms quoted in the AEX covering part or all of the period  from 1983 
to 1997. Results emanating from study yielded proof of market timing in that share price run-ups 
increased chances of equity and dual issues. Effects of share price run-ups on the alternatives 
between issuance of equity, debt or both are consistent with predictions of market timing theory. 
Contrary to the prevailing evidence for US firms, the study failed to confirm persistent effect 
market timing has on capital structures of Dutch companies. 
Further contradiction as pertains market timing theory was found in a study that utilized an 
unbalanced panel data set containing 754 firms, among which 165 were UK firms , 241 US firms 
and 348 continental European firms for the period from 1991 to 2000, through which 
Bruinshoofd & de Haan,(2012) provided comparative global proof on impact of market timing 
on corporate capital structures. The study utilized GLS which unlike OLS allows the presence of 
autocorrelation within panels and cross-sectional correlation and heteroscedasticity across 
panels. They demonstrated that the negative correlation between historical MBR that existed for 
US firms did not apply to UK and continental European firms. Continental European companies 
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raised their leverage ratios when share prices were high by timing long-term debt issues which 
strongly inclined to pecking order theory where debt is preferred over external equity. 
Market timing confirmation is achieved using of debt in a study done in China by Zhou et al., 
(2012). Using company-level data for corporate debt offerings by 3040 US firms for the period 
from 1970 to 2006, they employ three models the horse-race model, temporal lead-lag model, 
and the VAR model to test two theories. They investigated if managers relied on theoretical 
strategies when issuing debt, which involved betting on the future debt market condition, or they 
made their debt issues in response to variations of prevailing market conditions as compared to 
past. Put differently, they sought to establish whether forward-looking (prediction) or 
backwards-looking (reaction) market timing dominate companies’ debt offering decisions. 
Findings from the study indicated that a company’s debt issuance heavily depended on 
backwards looking to past information. Thus, corporate managers were inclined to offer debt 
when rates of interest were particularly low in comparison to historical levels. The study found 
support for backward- market timing. 
Further support of market timing theory has also been found in Africa, through a study by 
Bougatef & Chichti, (2010). Sampling 30 publicly traded Tunisian companies and 100 non-
financial French companies and applying panel data regression to examine significance of 
market timing considerations in security issuance choices for the period from 2000 to 2008. 
Logical with market timing theory, their findings revealed that companies tended to offer stocks 
when they were overvalued by market and after market performance improved. Consequently, 
these companies became underleveraged in short-run and this effect of market timing on capital 
structure continued for more than eight years. 
Agreeing with these results is a study conducted by Reddy & Tran, (2017) who examined capital 
structure and market timing using data from both developed and developing countries. Sampling 
12,181 publicly listed non-financial and non-utility companies for the period 2007 to 2015, they 
employed ordinary least squares (OLS) measure utilized by Baker & Wurgler, (2002). Findings 
from the study indicated equity market timing influence on firms' capital structure was persistent 
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for countries with well-developed stock markets and institutional structures. However, individual 
country regression results were much weaker and insignificant for many countries which 
suggested that stock market and institutional environments in many developing countries were 
not well developed which impacted on study results where market timing persistent effect was 
not confirmed.  
Contrary to the findings of Reddy & Tran, (2017) and Bougatef & Chichti, (2010) studies, 
Moyo, (2016) investigated security issuance decisions of financial services companies in South 
Africa. The study tested authenticity of pecking order, dynamic trade-off and market timing 
theories in describing the financing behaviour of 29 financial services companies quoted on the 
JSE during the period from 2003 - 2012 The study employed the modified, Bruinshoofd & de 
Haan,(2012) External Finance-Weighted Average MBR as the market timing measure. Results of 
this study rejected both market timing and pecking order theories. Conclusions drawn from the 
study indicated that stock performance and returns did not influence security issuance decisions 
of these companies. Excluding the correlation between leverage and company growth, results 
strongly confirmed dynamic trade-off theory. Thus, JSE listed financial services firms had 
targeted ideal capital structures which they deliberately adjusted towards.  
In Kenya, Ater, (2017b) reviewed current literature on relationship between capital structure and 
market timing theory of capital structure in the contact of emerging markets. Empirical studies 
reviewed revealed that market timing influences capital structure and company’s performance. 
Additionally, market timing impact and magnitude on capital structure is not clearly stated as 
different studies revealed mixed results. One set of the studies discovered that market timing 
creates capital structure distortion of companies while the other set claimed that the impact of 
market timing on capital structure has been inconsistent.  
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2.3.4 Stakeholders views on market timing  
The third objective of the study sought to ascertain finance managers view with regard to market 
timing by listed firms at the NSE. Managers’ confirmation of market timing of security issues 
has been viewed as the most convincing confirmation of market timing by companies as follows; 
From reviewed literature, stakeholders who included Chief Finance officers (CFOs) and 
managers agreed to have market timed their security issuance decisions in anonymous surveys 
which has so far been deemed as most convincing proof of market timing. Graham & Harvey, 
(2001) performed an anonymous survey on 392 CFOs in the US and Canada firms regarding 
capital budgeting, cost of capital and capital structure. Findings from these surveys indicated that 
67% of CFOS were in agreement that the amount by which their share was undervalued or 
overvalued was a key consideration in issuing equity and nearly as many agreed that if their 
share price had in recent times increased the price at which they could sell was ‘high’. In the 
survey, equity market prices were viewed as more important than 9 out of 10 other factors 
considered in the common stock issue decision and more important than all 4 other factors 
considered in the convertible debt issue decision. 
Graham & Harvey, (2001) also sought to find out whether CFOs attempted to time interest rates 
through debt issuance when they felt market interest rates were particularly low. They found out 
a moderately strong evidence for such market timing of interest rates. Evidence from the survey 
suggested that market timing was crucial for large firms which implied that firms with large or 
sophisticated treasury departments were more likely to time interest rates. Further evidence 
suggested that firms also market time interest rates when issuing short-term debt. When CFOs 
felt that short rates were low as compared to long rates or expected long term rates to decline, 
they agreed to borrow using short-term debt.  
Agreeing with survey results is another anonymous survey of managers of 707 firms in sixteen 
European countries by Bancel & Mittoo, (2004), who sought to investigate the link that existed 
between theory and practice of capital structure applying to all countries with varying legal 
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systems and structures. Evidence from this survey indicated that a company’s ability to meet 
unexpected expenses and investment opportunities as well as earnings per share dilution were the 
two most important factors of capital structure decisions for European companies. Managers of 
these firms used the windows of opportunities for financing in raising capital and they also 
valued hedging considerations. When selecting the maturity of debt and when raising capital 
abroad, the primary factor these managers put into consideration appeared to be their hedging 
considerations.  
European managers in this survey seemed to worry about two factors when constructing their 
capital structure choices; financial flexibility and the influence such decisions had on the 
financial statements. The ability to meet unexpected expenses and investment opportunities was 
identified as a key factor that the European manager’s put into consideration when accessing 
financing externally despite the economic projections in their countries. This financial flexibility 
was achieved through choosing an opportune time to make an issue based on the valuation of 
equity by the market or the prevailing interest rate levels which tended to be consistent with the 
window of opportunity hypothesis. Further evidence from this survey suggested that managers 
tend to be concerned about financing decisions impact on financial statements. The dilution of 
earnings per share was a major concern for managers when issuing shares and was considered as 
an advantage when issuing convertible debt.  
2.4 Research gap 
Regarding a firm's investment financing decisions, the Modigliani-Miller theorem opened the 
literature on the fundamental nature of debt versus equity. The capital structure of a firm is the 
result of the transactions with various suppliers of finance. In perfect capital markets world of 
Modigliani & Miller,(1958), different forms of financing costs do not vary in isolation resulting 
with lack of advantage derived from opportunistically selecting between equity and debt. 
However, financing clearly matters due to differences in taxes rates, levels of information and 
costs of agency. Theories of capital structure also differ in how these factors are interpreted with 
each emphasizing on some cost and benefits of financing strategies alternatives.  
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As pertains market timing theory, there is no ideal capital structure, since market timing 
decisions accumulate over time into the capital structure outcome (Baker & Wurgler, 2002).    
The theory states that capital structure decisions are made based on capital market circumstances. 
Interest rate levels and share prices are the driving forces for debt and equity issuance decisions 
respectively. A company’s decision to issue equity depends on the share market performance and 
the present valuation of its stocks. Companies only issue stocks when they believe the firm’s 
stocks are presently overvalued, otherwise they will issue debt (Barclay & Smith, 2005).            
Various evidence points to market timing being an important aspect of real financial policy. This 
evidence emanates from various analyses of real financing decisions, analyses of long-term 
returns post equity issues and repurchases, analyses of realized and forecast earnings around 
equity issues, and managers surveys. 
From reviewed literature, it is evident academic research on market timing and capital structure 
still give controversial, inconclusive and mixed findings. According to market timing theory, 
managers have confidence that they can time the equity market but are not in a position to 
immediately differentiate between mispricing and the dynamic information asymmetry version 
of market timing and the sole determining factor of corporate financing is overvaluation and or 
undervaluation of securities. Factors like non-debt tax shield, interest tax shields, agency and the 
time-varying adverse selection costs do not influence security issuance decisions.  
Developed financial markets such as US, a well-established view is that firms take advantage of 
market valuations with regard to their intrinsic valuations when making financial decisions. 
What remains unclear is whether firms in developing financial markets such as Kenya follow a 
similar behaviour. Therefore, the study sought to ascertain whether managers of listed firms at 
the NSE market time their security issues and the extent to which the presence of market timing 





2.5 Conceptual framework on market timing and capital structure 
A conceptualization of the major variables under examination in the study is brought out in this 
section. Market timing is the independent variable whereas capital structure whose proxies are 
both book leverage and market leverage are dependent variables. Control variables utilised in the 
study include profitability, company size, tangibility of assets, liquidity, stock market 
performance, real interest rates, inflation, yield spread and risk. 
Figure 1.0 : Conceptual framework  
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2.5.1 Operationalization of variables 
A description of how the variables utilised in the study were measured is done in this section. 
This has been depicted in the table 1.0.  
Table 1.0: Study Variables  
 
Source: Author(2019) 





Book leverage Book-Lev. (Baker & Wurgler, 2002); (Alti, 2006) Book debt / Total assets D/A
Market leverage Market Lev (Baker & Wurgler, 2002) ;(De Bie & De
Haan, 2007)
Book debt / Total assets-
book equity + market equity 
D/(A-BE+ME)
Independent variable:
Market timing MBR (Baker & Wurgler, 2002);(Alti, 2006);(De
Bie & De Haan, 2007);(Bruinshoofd & de
Haan, 2012)(Bruinshoofd & de Haan,
2012);(Vallandro et al., 2014); (Hovakimian,
2006)
Total Assets - Book Equity
+ Market Equity/Total assets
(A-BE+ME)/A
Control variables:
Profitability PROFIT (Baker & Wurgler, 2002) ;(Alti, 2006) ;(De
Bie & De Haan, 2007) ;(Elliott et al. 2008);
(Vallandro et al., 2014); (Hovakimian, 2006)
Earnings Before Interest,
Taxes, Depreciation and
amortization / Total Assets
EBITDA/A
Risk RISK (Vallandro et al., 2014) Standard Deviation of
Profitability
σ (Prof)
Inflation INFLATION (Zhou et al., 2012) The annual percentage
change of the CPI in each
monthly observation
The annual percentage
change of the CPI in each
monthly observation
Yield spread YIELD SPREAD (Zhou et al., 2012)  10-year constant maturity 
Treasury bond rates - the 91-
day treasury bill rate
 10-year constant maturity 
Treasury bond rates - the 
91-day treasury bill rate
Company size SIZE (Baker & Wurgler, 2002) ;(Alti, 2006) ;(De
Bie & De Haan, 2007) ;(Elliott et al. 2008);
(Vallandro et al., 2014); (Hovakimian, 2006)
Natural logarithm of sales Log (S)
Tangibility of assets PPE (Baker & Wurgler, 2002) ;(Alti, 2006) ;(De
Bie & De Haan, 2007) ;(Elliott et al, 2008);
(Vallandro et al, 2014); (Hovakimian, 2006)
Fixed Assets (PPE) / Total
Assets
FA/A





MARKET (Marsh, 1982) NSE 20 share index returns NSE 20 share index
returns t-1 – NSE 20
share index returns t
Real Interest rate INTEREST (Elliott et al, 2008); (Vallandro et al, 2014) Average annual interest rate
as announced by CBK
Average annual interest





The control variables utilised as major determinants of leverage are those proposed by Rajan & 
Zingales, (1995) and utilized by Baker & Wurgler, (2002) in their study. Six other control 
variables were added which are regarded as possible determinants of capital structure.  
 
Even though the pecking order and the static trade-off theories postulate negative or positive 
relationship between leverage and its determinants, equity market timing theory does not 
automatically settle on a direct or inverse relationship between leverage and the determinants of 
capital structure. According to market timing hypothesis, firms change their leverage levels using 
equity issue or debt issue strategy whenever they take cognizance of the windows of 
opportunities in stock or money market and not necessarily depending on their characteristics 
such as size, liquidity, tangibility or profitability. 
 
However, as per the independent variable, an inverse relationship is expected between leverage 
and the market timing measure of MBR, since companies with a greater (lower) MBR tend to 
issue more stocks (debt) so as to gain from the overvaluation of their securities and the low-cost 
funds, resulting in a reduction (increase) in leverage, as projected by the market timing theory.  
 
2.6 Summary of the chapter on literature review 
This chapter begins by discussing relevant theories on which this study was anchored on;     
market timing, trade-off, pecking order and the ‘Irrelevance’ theories. The theories are discussed 
to enhance the understanding of the market timing, MBR, capital structure, profitability, 
liquidity, company growth, tangibility of assets, stock market performance, stock returns and 
operating performance. The chapter also included an empirical analysis of the study objectives 
and the development of the hypothesis tested in this study. The research gap was then identified. 
The chapter concluded by presenting the conceptual framework diagrammatically and 




            CHAPTER THREE 
  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses in detail the methodology adopted in data collection, analysis and 
presentation of findings in pursuit of the study objectives. The chapter is divided into the 
following subsections, 3.2 explains the research philosophy, 3.3 explains the population, and 3.4 
explains the research sample. 3.5 explains the research design, 3.6 elaborates on the data 
collection and the research instruments, 3.7 elaborates the data analysis. Research quality and 
ethical considerations upheld are discussed in subsections 3.8 and 3.9 respectively. 
3.2 Research Philosophy 
Research philosophy is a belief about gathering analysing and using data about a phenomenon. 
The purpose of research philosophy is to assess the assumptions that support the adopted 
research strategy together with the practical experiences, relationship to knowledge and the 
process through which they have been formed in real life situations Saunders, Lewis, & 
Thornhill, (2009). A pragmatic research philosophy was adopted in this study. Saunders et al., 
(2009) indicates that pragmatics recognize that there are various ways of understanding the 
world and doing research and that no one view can ever give the entire picture as there are many 
realisms. A concept is only accepted and considered relevant if it supports action in this 
philosophy. According to this philosophy, the research question forms the basis of any study. 
More than one research approach and research strategies are integrated in the same study in this 
philosophy unlike positivist and interpretivist research philosophies. 
3.3 Research design 
The research design details an outline of how the research will take place. The research 
employed a concurrent triangulation design where both the qualitative and quantitative data were 
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collected during the same stage. Likewise, both the secondary and the primary data were 
collected in one phase, and subsequently analyzed separately and later compared and combined 
in the discussion of the findings from which the conclusions were drawn. This design was used 
to overcome the weakness in one research design with the strengths of another. The weakness 
that proved to be inherent in primary were subdued by the strengths of secondary data and vice 
versa. In the bid to advocate for this research design, Creswell, (2008) supports this in expanding 
on quantitative data through a collection of open-ended quantitative data. This design was found 
to be appropriate for this study because it enabled the researcher to define in a more accurate 
way, the variables of this study and at the same draw time irrefutable findings and conclusion. 
3.4 Target Population 
The target population is the entire group of people, events or things that the researcher intends to 
investigate (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). In this study, the population comprised of 21 companies 
quoted at the NSE that issued capital through rights issue and/or corporate debt for a period of 10 
years between 2006 to 31st December 2016.It also comprised of 32 matching firms making the 
total population sample to 53 for objective 1.Objective 2 and 3 have a population of 21 
companies and a sample size of 21 companies. At this period, it is when most rights and 
corporate debt issues took place at the NSE. 21 rights issues and 27 corporate debts were issued 
at the NSE in the period under review as indicated in Appendix 3.  




Companies listed on NSE Period Size
Issued capital through rights of issue/
corporate debt
2006 to 2016 21 companies
Matched firms 2006 to 2016 32 companies
Total sample size 53 companies
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Table 2.1: population and sample size for the specific objectives 
 
3.5 Sample size 
A Sample can be defined as the part of the population that helps us to draw conclusions about the 
population. The 21 companies sample derived for this study through systematic census sampling 
techniques which employed the following criterion; companies must have been listed/or listed on 
NSE in the period from 2006 to 2016 to give a sample of 10 years.  Examination, the capital 
issued must have been through rights issue and corporate debt. For primary data the research 
questionnaire was administered to all the 21 companies that offered rights issue and corporate 
debt during the period under review. This enabled exploitation of any distinguishing 
characteristics of companies which offered rights issue and corporate debt and it enabled the 
selection of a sample size that provided the desired results considering all necessary factors of 
the population.  
3.6 Data collection methods  
Data collection refers to the process of gathering and measuring information so as to answer 
questions that prompted the undertaking of the research. The study utilized both primary and 
secondary data.  
Secondary data gathered for this research included; daily closing share prices and the stock 
market performance as measured by NSE 20 share index return, inflation rates as measured by 
monthly CPI index derived from Kenya Bureau of Statistics (KEBS); 10-year constant maturity 
Treasury bond rates and 91 days treasury bill rates acquired from the Central Bank of Kenya; 
sales, total assets, MBR of the listed companies and EBITDA obtained from financial reports and 
listed company’s websites. Annual financial reports obtained from CMA and NSE. This 






information was sought in the pursuit of achieving the first and second objectives of the study. 
The challenge realized in obtaining secondary data was incompleteness and lack of authentic 
data. This challenge was subjugated by sourcing data from more than one recognized sources. In 
dealing with the lack of authentic data, preference was given to verifiable sources such as capital 
and money markets and their regulators. In situations where the data could not be found from 
those credible sources, then the researcher retrieved the data from the specific firm databases and 
websites.  
Primary data was collected through the face to face administration of a questionnaire that 
contained both open and closed-ended questions. The questionnaire was structured as follows; 
section 1: General information questions were asked, section 2: Capital structure questions were 
asked, Section 3: equity market timing questions were asked and finally section 4: debt market 
timing questions were asked. They were issued to finance managers and directors of the 21 listed 
companies which made corporate debt and rights issue during the period under review. The data 
collected included their opinions on market timing and how it influenced and affected their 
financing decision-making process and the resultant capital structures.  
Primary data was utilised exclusively to tackle the third objective of the study. By assessing 
opinions of finance managers and directors, the data obtained proved useful for this objective 
because it was acquired from people who held leadership positions and were directly involved in 
the financial decision-making of the listed firms (Kothari, 2004). However, the primary data has 
inherent weaknesses which include lack of objectivity and incompleteness of the questionnaires. 
This challenge has also been indicated by (Kothari, 2004). Any incomplete questionnaire was 
removed from the sample to enhance completeness.  
3.7 Data analysis  
Data analysis refers to the systematic application of statistical tools in processing data into 
meaningful information (Saunders et al., 2009). This study employed, event study methodology, 
regression analysis and descriptive statistics for both primary and secondary data, where data 
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was recorded, organized, coded in summary tables and distribution charts in readiness for 
analysis. The association between independent and dependent variable was measured using a 
regression analysis. Additionally, the method has been commonly used to assess market timing 
and capital structure. Secondary data was organized in spreadsheets and SPSS and/or Stata to 
enable meaningful analysis afterwards this data was presented on frequency tables, graphs, pie 
charts and histograms for analysis purpose. Data was analysed as follows with reference to the 
study objectives: 
3.7.1 Assessing the Presence of market timing  
The aim of the first objective of the study was to investigate the presence of market timing in 
security issuance decisions by companies listed at the NSE. Prior studies indicated that share 
price and operating performance of firms that issue securities deteriorated after such issues 
Spiess & Affleck-Graves, (1995); Loughran & Ritter, (1997) ;McLaughlin et al., (1996) ;Spiess 
& Affleck-Graves, (1999). The decline in share and operating performance has been attributed to 
market timing and free cash-flow hypotheses. These often coincide with a run-up of stock prices 
and operating performance of such firms. The objective was addressed through an analysis of 
share returns prior and after announcement of the rights issue or corporate debt event. Stock 
returns of issuing firms were later compared with stock returns of non-issuing listed firms of 
similar size the process enabled comparison between firms. An event study methodology was 
utilised to evaluate the stock price response to rights issues and corporate debt issuance 
announcements.  
Fama, Fisher, Jensen, & Roll, (1969) instituted the event study methodology while studying how 
common stock prices reacted to a stock split. Binder, (1998) argues that event study 
methodology has been extensively utilised to analyse stock price behaviour around events such 
as accounting rule changes, earnings announcements, changes in CEO, securities issues 
announcements and dividend announcements. Event studies mainly test market efficiency in 
incorporating information received by the market and to analyse the effect such events have on 
the wealth of a company’s shareholders (Binder, 1998).  
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In event studies, models are utilized to estimate expected returns. These models include; the 
mean adjusted return, market adjusted return, market model adjusted return, Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) adjusted return and Fama-French three factor models. In conducting 
event studies an event window and estimation period have to be identified. This is because the 
effect of the event on a stock price is examined during the event window whereas the expected 
return of a share is estimated during the estimation period which represents a neutral period prior 
to the event window.  
The study employed market adjusted return model in analysing performance of stocks in listed 
firms that offered rights issues and corporate debt in the study period. This model employs the 
market return (Rmt) as the expected return over the event window period. The benefit in using 
this model is that in all situations where the model is used no estimation period is needed. The 
expected return is equal to the market return in the market adjusted return model, since beta (β) is 
assumed to be 1 and the intercept (α) to be zero in the regression model used to calculate the 
expected return. The NSE 20 share index was used to calculate the market return because NASI 
the other alternative was introduced on 25th February 2008 way after the study period considered 
for this study. 
Equation 1.0:  Expected Return Rate 
 
Where: 
E (Rit) -represents expected return of firm i on day t during the event window 
Rmt- represents the NSE 20 share index return on day t within the event window 
The market adjusted return demonstrated that changes that arose in individual stocks value were 
as a result of the announcement of security issuance; it can be calculated as shown below: 





Equation 1.1: Market Adjusted Return 
 
Where: 
ARit -represents the Market Adjusted Abnormal return of firm i on day t in the event window 
Rit -represents the return of firm i on day t within the event window 
Rmt-represents NSE 20 share index return on day t within the event window 
The steps in conducting an event study include; identify the event to be tested, define the period 
to be studied in terms of both the event window and event date, estimate the expected returns, 
calculate the abnormal returns and calculate cumulative abnormal returns, test for the 
significance of the abnormal returns and finally analyse and interpret the results from the test 
statistic. These were the steps followed in carrying out the event study methodology in this 
study. The event window was 60 days; 30 days before and 30 days after the event date (Oler, 
Harrison, & Allen, 2008). The event date taken was the date the announcement of allotment 
results of the securities issuance were made to the public for both the rights issue and corporate 
debt and was taken to be day 0.The duration of the event window was factored in so as to 
consider any pre-event response since in developing countries information environment nature is 
such that the market response starts prior to the actual announcements. 
3.7.2 Market timing and capital structures of listed firms at the NSE. 
The second objective of the study was achieved through examination of the association between 
market timing and capital structures of listed firms. Panel data regression analysis was utilised to 
assess the effect of predictor variables on the response variable. Some studies on market timing 
and capital structure in literature reviewed used panel data regression analysis such as (Bougatef 
ARit = Rit – Rmt 
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& Chichti, (2010); De Bie & De Haan, (2007); Bruinshoofd & de Haan, (2012). Panel data 
comprises of both cross-sectional and time series elements and embodies information across both 
time and space (Brooks, 2014). The benefits realized in using panel data analysis over pure time 
series data included: it enhanced the quantity and quality of data and allowed the researcher to 
isolate influences that are incapable of being spotted using pure time-series analysis. Panel data 
allowed the researcher to control for variables that were not observable or measured such as 
varied business practices across firms, social cultural factors as well as variables that varied over 
time but not across entities. This variables include, change in the national policies, change in 
federal regulations, and change in international agreements. Panel data accounted for individual 
heterogeneity and also allowed for multi-level or hierarchical modelling where the variables 
were included at different levels of an analysis. Some drawbacks of using the panel data 
consisted of, data collection challenges for instance coverage, sampling design and non-reply in 
the case of micro panels. These challenges were addressed by using census sampling of all the 
listed companies that offered corporate debt and rights issue in the period under review. Panel 
data was applied in the examination of secondary data for quantitative analysis and thus solving 
non-response in this study. 
When handling panel data a researcher can chose from three panel estimator approaches. First, a 
pooled regression of the data can be done, a fixed effects or the random effects models. When 
pooled regression is used the pooled estimator assumes αi to be the same across all cross-section 
units. The fixed effects model permits the intercept alpha (αi) in the regression model to vary 
cross-sectionally but not over time, while all the gradient estimates are static both cross-
sectionally and over time. The random effects approach or the error components model proposes 
different intercept terms for each entity and these intercepts do not vary over time. Under the 
random effects model, the intercepts for each cross-sectional unit are assumed to arise from a 
common intercept alpha (αi) (which is the same for all cross-sectional units and over time) plus a 
random variable (εi) that varies cross-sections but is constant over time. 
To select amongst these 3 approaches a test of homogeneity is computed. The hypothesis of 
homogeneity of constants across all cross-section units is formulated as follows: 
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Equation 1.2: Homogeneity of constants 
 
Fisher test is computed as follows: 
Equation 1.3: Fishers Test 
 
Where; 
SSP-- Residues square sum of the model Pooled. 
SSW- -Residues square sum of the individual effects model 
N-number of firms 
K-number of explanatory variables 
If calculated F is lower than tabulated F (p-value < 0.05), H0 is rejected and we have to select 
between the fixed and the random effects model. 
With the assumption that the effect is individual, the Hausman specification test is carried out to 
determine whether the fixed or the random effects model should be adopted. This test compares 
the fixed and random effects estimates of coefficients. The hypothesis to be tested is concerned 
with the correlation of individual effects and the explanatory variables as indicated below; 
F= SSP-SSW / SSW * N(T-1-) -K / (N-1) 
 
H0: αi= α 




constantsH0: αi= α 
H1: αi ≠ α 
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Equation 1.4: Correlation of individual effects and explanatory variables 
 
Under the null hypothesis, the individual effects are random. If the null hypothesis is retained the 
estimator chosen is Generalized least squares. The alternative hypothesis assumes the individual 
effects are correlated to the independent variables. If the null hypothesis is rejected, then a model 
to fix the effects is chosen. 
The Hausman test compares the matrix of variance-covariance of 2 estimators: 
H= (β̂RE- βF̂E)’ [var (βR̂E- β̂FE)]-1(βR̂E- β̂FE) 
The statistic H is asymptotically distributed χ2   with K degree of freedom, where K is the number 
of independent variables. If calculated H is lower than tabulated χ2 (p-value < 0.05), H0 is 
rejected and individual effects are assumed to be fixed. 
The panel data regression models that were estimated are; 
Book-Lev i, t = αi.t + β1MBRi, t +β2PROFITi, t + β3SIZE i, t+ β4PPE I, t+ β5LIQUIDITYi, t+ 
β6INTERESTi, t+ β7Inflation i, t+ β8YIELD SPREAD i, t+ β9Risk i, t+ β10 Market i, t + εi, t 
Market-Lev i, t= αi.t + β1MBRi, t +β2PROFIT i, t+ β3SIZEi, t+ β4PPE i, t+ β5LIQUIDITY i, t+ 
β6INTERESTi, t + β7Inflation I, t+ β8YIELD SPREAD I, t+ β9 Risk I, t + β10Market i, t + εi, t 
Where; 
Book-Lev= Book Leverage and is calculated as Book debt/Total assets  
Book debt=Total asset less book equity 
H0: cov (αi, Xit) = 0 
H1: cov (αi, Xit) ≠0 
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Book equity=Total assets less total liabilities and preferred stock plus deferred 
taxes and convertible debt 
Market-Lev= Market leverage and is calculated as Book debt/Total assets- book equity + 
market equity  
Market equity=common share outstanding multiplied by price 
Market timing = MBR which is calculated by taking the total assets of a firm less the book 
value of equity then add the market value of equity divided by the total assets of each firm at the 
end of each fiscal year. 
Profit =Profitability is calculated as EBITDA of firm (i) in year (t) divided by total assets of firm 
(i) at the end of year (t).  
Market = Market performance is measured by NSE 20 share index returns. Market performance 
is calculated by measuring the growth on the NSE all share index between year (t-1) and year (t).  
Size= Company size is measured by taking a natural logarithm of sales for year t. 
PPE=Tangibility of assets which is calculated by dividing Property, Plant, and Equipment by 
total assets. 
Liquidity= calculated as current assets divided by current liabilities. 
Interest = the average rate of interest announced by the central bank of Kenya (CBK) for year t 
was considered. 
Inflation = is defined as the annual percentage change of the CPI in each monthly observation 
Yield spread= measured by the difference between the 10-year constant maturity Treasury bond 
rates and the 91-day treasury bill rate, which were taken as the proxies for long term and short 
term interest rates.  
Risk= measured as standard deviation of profit, σ (Prof) 
 
αi.t = Constant term. 
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β1 to β4 =Regression Coefficients. 
 
ε = the error term, which defines the variation in the response variable which cannot be 
explained by the included predictor variables.  
The regression analysis proceeds as in the case of a multiple linear regression using ordinary 
least squares estimation technique, if pooled regression is confirmed as the appropriate model to 
use. 
To test for statistical significance, the (T) statistic is used. The test of significance is done at the 
individual company level and then compared for all the companies in the sample. This study uses 
5% level of significance which is the accepted conventional level in social sciences research. 
This level of significance indicates that 95 times out of 100, the researcher will be sure that there 
exists a true or significant correlation between the two variables, and only a 5% chance that the 
relationship does not truly exist. 
Explanatory power of the control variables was measured by first performing panel data 
regressions without the control variables with the strength of the predictive power of model 
being checked using the coefficient of determination, adjusted R2, and then the control variables 
were added into the models to establish the joint predictive power of all the determinants of the 
capital structure using adjusted R2. 
If individual effects are correlated with the independent variables, then a fixed effects model 
would be chosen. The model estimated under the fixed effects model is; 
Equation 1.5: Model estimated under fixed effects 
 
Where; 
Yit= α +βxit + μi + νit 
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Yit - Represents the capital structure of a firm 
α – Represents intercept term 
β is a k*1- Represents the vector of parameters to be estimated on the explanatory variables 
xit- is a 1* k- Represents the vector of observations on the explanatory variables, t=1,….T; 
i=1,….N 
μi - individual firm specific effects. Represents all of the variables that affect Yit cross-sectionally 
but are constant over time for instance the industry an entity operates in, the country where the 
firm has its headquarters, etc. 
νit - Represents the “remainder disturbance” that changes over time and across firms. It captures 
everything that is unexplained as regards the capital structures. 
This model was estimated using dummy variables, hence termed as the least squares dummy 
variables (LSDV) approach. 
Equation 1.6: LSDV Approach 
 
Where 
 D1i- is a dummy variable that assumes the value of 1 for all observations on the first entity (for 
example the first company) in the sample and zero otherwise and so on.The intercept α has been 
eliminated from the equation to avoid the dummy variable trap where a perfect multicollinearity 
between the dummy variable and the intercept can exist. 
Yit= βxit+ μ1D1i+ μ2 D2i+ μ3D3i+……..+ μNDNi+ νit 
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In case individual effects are random, then choosing the generalized least squares model 
estimator becomes inevitable. When GLS is used the data used requires transformation so as to 
avoid cross-correlations in the error terms. Luckily, this is achieved through use of standard 
applications such as Stata and Eviews. The transformation involved is to subtract a weighted 
mean of the Yit overtime (part of the mean rather than the whole mean). Define the “quasi-
demeaned” data as yit*= yit -ӯi and xit* = xit -x̄i where ӯi and x̄i are the means over time of the 
observations on Yit and xit respectively. Therefore, the model to be estimated would be; 
 
3.7.3 Finance manager’s views with regard to market timing 
The third objective of this study focused on establishing the stakeholder's view on market timing 
by the NSE listed companies. To achieve this objective, closed and open-ended questionnaires 
were personally administered to finance managers /directors of the sampled companies to obtain 
their views on whether they practiced market timing in their security issuance and to establish 
the extent to which the presence of market timing influenced their financing decision making and 
the resultant capital structures. Appendix 2 contains the sample questionnaire whereas Appendix 
3 contains the NSE listed companies that raised capital through rights and corporate debt.  
 3.8 Research quality 
This research safeguarded the research quality through scholarly peer review and enhanced by 
providing sufficient information concerning the major research components of the study; such as 
population of interest description, sampling techniques explanation, definition of key concepts 
and variables, descriptive statistics of the main variables and description of the analytic 
techniques employed. This study responded to the research questions with rigor and scientific 
manner. Any potential threats to the study’s validity were addressed as follows; 
Yit -ӯi=β1 (xit - x̄i) + (νit - ⊽i) 
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3.8.1 Internal Validity 
The study sought to explain whether changes in the result could be attributed to other 
explanations other than those explored in the research. The study objectively explained how 
alternative explanations were ruled out in arriving at the conclusions drawn from the data 
analysis. 
3.8.2 External Validity 
The study explained the possibility of the findings being generalized beyond companies whose 
place, time and circumstances differed from those of firms that have raised capital through rights 
issue and corporate debt. 
3.8.3 Construct validity 
Key concepts of the research were sufficiently measured to enhance the credibility of the study. 
The measures and methods used have been independently authenticated in previous studies. It 
sought to establish how effectively the variables used represented the ideological image of the 
concepts and their manifestation in reality. The constructs used to collect primary data were also 
tested for consistency of the responses received using the Cronbach’s Alpha test results is 
presented in the table No. 3.0 
Table 3.0: Reliability test 
 
The test results revealed that the reliability coefficient for equity market timing was 0.768; Debt 
market timing had a coefficient of 0.949.A coefficient of 0.70 and above implies high degree of 
reliability of the data. Hence all the constructs were found to be reliable. 





Equity Market Timing 7 0.768     Acceptable
Debt market timing 4 0.949 Acceptable
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The research also applied research assessment tools to evaluate the quality of the study. Turnitin 
an internet-based plagiarism-prevention service was also used to establish originality of the 
study. 
 3.9 Ethical considerations 
Ethics is paramount when conducting research. All referenced materials were duly cited using 
the APA referencing style set by the university guidelines to avoid plagiarism. The research was 
conducted taking care not to harm respondents, whether physically, mentally or emotionally. The 
information used in the study was gathered from respondents who willingly accepted to 
participate. Research questionnaires were administered and then collected from firms that were 
willing to give out the information required. Those companies that did not respond follow up 
were done via email and if no response was received the company was considered as a non-
response. Privacy and confidentiality of the respondents, their organizations and the information 
they provided was guaranteed and guarded throughout the study. The study did not refer to a 
specific respondent or company during the writing of this thesis report. Proper authorizations 
were sought before data was gathered from the respondents and the acquired information used 
solely for academic purposes. An introduction letter was requested and granted which was 
delivered to the sampled firms when collecting the data. The information used in this study was 




                                                            CHAPTER FOUR 
               DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 4.1 Introduction 
The study sought to examine presence of market timing in security issuance decisions by 
companies listed at the NSE. The chapter presents data analysis results and findings with regard 
to study objectives. The chapter is structured as follows: 4.2 presents general information about 
the secondary and primary data used; 4.3 covers the first objective of the study, investigation of 
presence of market timing by security issuing firms; 4.4 discusses the second objective of the 
study, the association between market timing and capital structures observed in listed companies; 
4.5 findings of the finance managers view with regard to market timing and 4.6 presents the 
chapter summary. 
4.2 Presence of Market Timing  
The first objective of the study sought to investigate presence of market timing in securities 
issuance by firms listed at the NSE. This objective was achieved through an events study 
methodology aimed at establishing the announcement effect of securities issuance by the listed 
firms at the NSE.  
Prior findings of research on market timing indicate performance of stock prices of market 
timing firms issuing securities deteriorate after such issues Ritter, (1991);Spiess & Affleck-
Graves, (1999);Loughran & Ritter, (1995);Spiess & Affleck-Graves, (1995). The study sought to 
establish whether securities issuing firms in the NSE do market timing on corporate debt and 
rights issues and as a result their stock prices performance should deteriorate after such issuance. 
This was achieved through a comparison of CAR of issuing to non-issuing firms of similar size 
and running a Kruskal Wallis test to test for the significance of the CAR prior and post 
announcement of securities issuance. The aim was to establish differences if any, in returns 
before and after the announcement of issuance of corporate debt and rights issues and whether 
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such declaration had any impact on stock prices of issuing firms. Two measures were calculated 
for each company, AR and CAR.  
4.2.4 Rights issue analysis 
For the rights issuing firms both the CAR returns before and after the issue were calculated and 
considered as the basis of analysing the general effect on share prices. The comparison between 
the 30 days prior CAR, the date of announcement and 30 days post the announcement are 
presented in appendix VII.  
From the comparison made for post CAR 9 out of the 12 rights issuing firms under analysis 
underperformed their non-issuing firms matched by size. This means that the stock prices of the 
rights issuing companies declined by a higher amount or increased by a smaller margin than their 
matching firms after the rights issue announcement. The study concluded that rights issuing 
firms underperformed size matched firms, a result in agreement with reviewed literature where 
securities offering companies shares, underperformed their non-issuing counterparts of similar 
size, Spiess & Affleck-Graves, (1995). Spiess & Affleck-Graves, (1995) established SEO firms 
median return was 10% in the 5-year period post issue compared to a median 5 year holding 
return of 42.3% for similar size, non-issuing companies in same industry. Deterioration of 
performance was similarly observed when companies were matched on the basis of MBR and 
size rather than sector and size classification. 
These findings concur with Loughran & Ritter, (1995) who established underperformance for 
both IPO and SEO companies when compared to firms which did not issue during the 5 years 
post issue. Loughran & Ritter, (1995) findings reveal the average annual return during the 5 
years post issuing is 5% and 7% for companies conducting IPOs and SEOs respectively. The 
abnormal returns were then subjected to tests of significance.  
To test for significance of abnormal returns the Kruskal Wallis test was utilised which  is a rank-
based nonparametric test. It was performed to demonstrate existence of any statistically 
significant differences between CAR in each set of matching firms. To choose between 
60 
 
parametric or non-parametric test, the rights issue data was subjected to tests of normality and 
homogeneity of variance.  
 Normality test results revealed that data was not normally distributed justifying use of non-
parametric tests to test for significance. Levene’s test was applied to test for homogeneity of 
variance. Levene’s test results indicated a statistically significant variance between the means, 
which indicates that group variances are unequal in the population. This indicated a violation of 
the homogeneity of variance test further affirming the use of non-parametric tests to test for 
significance. 
Kruskal Wallis test results presented in appendix IV established that all categories of companies 
recorded statistically significant variance in  both pre CAR and post CAR all with P_values of 
0.000.Therefore it can be concluded that the variance in the means of CAR before and after the 
rights issuance were probable due to rights issuance announcements. Hence, rights issuance 
announcements had a material impact on stock prices.This means that the securities issuance 
announcements acted as signals which affected the share prices of the rights issuing firms.This is 
as a result of statistically significant variance in the means before and after the rights issue 
announcement which indicated that the announcement had information content which 
determined the share prices. 
4.2.5 Corporate Debt abnormal returns analysis 
After the abnormal returns were calculated, the CAR  30 days before the corporate debt issuance, 
the announcement day CAR and the CAR 30 days after the announcement date were compared 
to establish whether corporate debt issuers under or over performed non-issuing firms matched 
by size. Appendix VIII presents comparison test results. This comparison reveals that corporate 
debt issuers outperformed non-issuing firms matched by size in post CAR. 8 out of 11 corporate 
debt issuers underperformed their non-issuing counterparts matched by size in post CAR 
meaning that their stock had a lower increase in share price or a higher decline in share price 
than the matching firms before the corporate debt issuance announcement. Therefore, the study 
concluded that corporate debt issuing firms recorded deterioration in post CAR after making the 
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corporate debt issuance as shown in the test results presented in Appendix VIII. This outcome 
concurs with findings from Spiess & Affleck-Graves, (1999) in their study on long-run 
performance of share returns following debt issue in US market. Spiess & Affleck-Graves, 
(1999) confirmed that for straight debt issuers, median sample company performs poorly than a 
similar size and MBR matched firm by almost 19% in the 5 years after debt issue while for 
issuers of convertible debt the median company underperformed its matched counterpart by 
nearly 20% in the 5 years after offering the convertible debt.  
The cumulative abnormal returns were then subjected to tests of significance. Test of 
significance are grouped into parametric and non-parametric tests. Parametric tests make some 
assumptions which must be met before the decisions to use them are made. The most critical of 
those assumptions is that the data must be normally distributed and also it does not violate the 
homogeneity of variance.  
Normality test results revealed that data was not distributed normally hence non-parametric tests 
were applied to significance testing. Homogeneity of variance test also indicated that the group 
means were unequal in the population hence affirming the use of non-parametric tests for 
significance testing. To test for significance, Kruskal Wallis test was applied and test outcomes 
are presented in appendix V which revealed that all categories of companies recorded 
statistically significant difference in pre and post CAR as shown by their p-values which are less 
than 0.05 except for the category with the pair of companies 53 and 54 which had a test statistic 
of χ2 (2) = 1.213, p=0.271 for pre CAR and χ2 (2) = 0.332, p=0.564 for post CAR hence 
statistically insignificant.  
 
Therefore it can be concluded that the variance in the means of CAR pre and post the corporate 
debt  issuance were likely due to the corporate debt  issuance announcements . Hence, the 
corporate debt announcements had a substantial impact on the share prices,meaning that the 




4.2.6 Conclusion on the first objective of the study 
This objective looked at the cumulative abnormal returns for corporate debt and rights issuing 
firms for the period between the years 2006 to 2016.Test results from the study indicated that 
both the corporate debt and rights issuing firms underperformed their non-issuing size matched 
firms. A finding confirms market timing presence in issuance of both securities which concurs 
with Spiess & Affleck-Graves, (1995) whose findings indicated that SEO firms post-offering 
performance was comparable to that of IPOs offering firms. The study findings are in conformity 
with Loughran & Ritter, (1995) who established underperformance for both IPO and SEO firms 
compared to non-issuing companies for 5 years following the issue date. Findings from this 
study reveal that IPO and SEO firms average annual return during the 5 years following an issue 
were 5% and 7% respectively.  
Spiess & Affleck-Graves, (1999) confirmed underperformance of stocks in firms issuing debt. 
Results from this study indicated that straight debt issuers median sample company 
underperformed a similar size and MBR matched company by nearly 19% in the 5 years post the 
debt issue while issuers of convertible debt underperformed its matched counterpart by nearly 
20% in the 5 years post convertible debt issue. 
4.3 Relationship between Market Timing and Capital Structure 
The study’s second objective sought to establish whether there existed a relationship between 
market timing and capital structure for listed companies at the NSE. This was achieved through 
panel data analysis. In panel data analysis behaviours of entities are observed over time. 
Variables that cannot be measured or observed for instance cultural factors, business practice 
difference or those that vary over period of time but not across entities are controlled by use of 
Panel data as it accounts for individual heterogeneity. The study utilised GLS as opposed to OLS 
which allows for presence of cross-sectional correlation ,autocorrelation within panels and 
heteroscedasticity across panels. 
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The data was unbalanced which refers to the fact that different companies make corporate debt 
and rights issues in different time periods and hence the data required for analysis differed from 
one company to another resulting in the unbalanced panel data. However, this did not limit the 
analysis as one can still run the model. 
4.3.1 Rights issue analysis 
4.3.1.1 Descriptive statistics  
Descriptive statistics of variables under the study are tabulated in Table 4.0. These include mean, 
standard deviation, minimum, maximum and the number of observations.  
Table 4.0: Descriptive Statistics-rights issues  
 
The table shows that there were 85 observations for each of the variables. 
4.3.1.2 Test for stationarity 
Stationarity is a qualitative process in which the statistical parameters including mean and 
standard deviation do not vary over time. The key property of a stationary process is that the 
auto-correlation function relies on one lag alone and does not vary with time at which the 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max N
Book Leverage     0.7214             0.2411     0.2406     1.3962 85
Market Leverage     0.7462             0.1613     0.2285     0.9789 85
MBR     0.9630             0.2463     0.3592     1.6077 85
Profitability     0.0444             0.0656    (0.3292)     0.3127 85
Risk     0.0281             0.0417     0.0046     0.1790 85
Inflation     7.9188             3.2412     4.1000   15.1000 85
Yield spread     3.5825             2.6613    (1.6340)     7.9810 85
Company Size   22.9969             1.4471   20.0313   25.4782 85
PPE     0.2205             0.2917     0.0062     0.8739 85
Liquidity     0.9708             0.4651     0.2600     2.7991 85
Market    (0.0113)             0.2388    (0.3533)     0.4210 85
Company growth     0.9630             0.2463     0.3592     1.6077 85
Interest rate   11.1505             5.2477     1.1800   19.7300 85
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function was calculated. Fisher-type unit-root test based on ADF was used to test for stationarity 
since the panels were unbalanced. The number of panels analysed were 9.  
Stationarity test results in appendix VI showed that the panel for profitability, inflation, company 
size, liquidity, market, company growth and interest rates were stationary whereas the panels for  
the other variables were found to contain unit roots and hence not stationary. 
4.3.1.3 Test for Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity is tested to establish whether any linear relationship exists among the 
explanatory variables. Pearson’s correlation coefficient matrix was used to test for 
multicollinearity between the independent variables.  
A correlation matrix is considered as a simple technique of detecting collinearity among the 
independent variables. The presence of high correlation is indicated by values that are greater 
than 0.9 (Gujarati & Porter, 2010). The table 4.1 shows the correlation coefficients are less than 
0.9 except for company growth which has a correlation coefficient of 1.000 with MBR. Hence 
company growth was eliminated from the analysis of book leverage for rights issue. All other 
independent variables were not correlated.  
Table 4.1: Correlation matrix for book leverage –rights issue 
 
BOOK LEV MBR PROF RISK Inflation Yield spreadCo. size PPE liquidity Market Co. growth interest rates
Book LEV Pearson Correlation 1
MBR Pearson Correlation .780
** 1










Inflation Pearson Correlation -0.008 -0.048 0.129 -0.064 1
Yield spread Pearson Correlation 0.053 0.127 0.006 0.02 -.318
** 1




** -0.149 -0.152 1




* -0.088 -0.026 .248
* 1











Market Pearson Correlation -0.055 0.048 0.03 -0.086 -.487
** -0.167 0.019 0.013 -0.026 1























**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Right issue- book leverage
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Test results as shown in table 4.2 indicate high correlation between company growth and MBR 
with a correlation co-efficient of 1.000. Hence Company growth was eliminated from the 
analysis of market leverage for rights issue. All other independent variable had correlation 
coefficients of less than 0.9. 
Table 4.2: correlation matrix for market leverage-rights issue 
 
Test results in table 4.3 reveal that only company growth and MBR are highly correlated hence 
company growth was eliminated from the analysis. All the other variables had correlation 
coefficients of less than 0.9. 
Table 4.3: correlation matrix for book leverage and corporate debt issues 
 
market lev. MBR Prof Risk Inflation yield spreadCo.size PPE liquidity Market Co. growth interest rate
Market Lev Pearson Correlation 1
MBR Pearson Correlation 0.071 1










Inflation Pearson Correlation 0.026 -0.048 0.129 -0.064 1
yield spread Pearson Correlation -0.051 0.127 0.006 0.02 -.318
** 1




** -0.149 -0.152 1




* -0.088 -0.026 .248
* 1











Market Pearson Correlation -0.113 0.048 0.03 -0.086 -.487
** -0.167 0.019 0.013 -0.026 1





















*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Market Leverage-rights issue
Book lev MBR Prof Risk Inflation yield spreadCo.size PPE Liquidity market Co. growth interest rates
Book Lev Pearson Correlation 1
MBR Pearson Correlation 0.073 1




Risk Pearson Correlation -.768
** 0.222 .581
** 1
Inflation Pearson Correlation -0.072 -0.138 0.063 0.076 1
yield spreadPearson Correlation 0.03 0.074 0.05 0.002 -.335
** 1





** 0.1 -0.085 0.041 1







** 0.051 0.016 .413
** 1




* -0.06 0.14 -.459
** 0.168 1
Market Pearson Correlation -0.092 -0.104 -0.06 0.03 -.404
** -0.156 -0.157 0.011 0.054 1
Co. growth Pearson Correlation 0.073 1.000
**
.779














* -0.005 0.129 1
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Book leverage-corporate debt issues
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From test outcomes presented in table 4.4 above, once more company growth is highly correlated 
with MBR and hence company growth was omitted from the analysis. All the other variables had 
correlation coefficients of less than 0.9. 
Table 4.4: Correlation matrix for market leverage-corporate debt issues 
 
4.3.1.4 Panel Regression with Book Leverage and MBR 
To carry out the panel data analysis, the first step involved performing the three models. Then 
Hausman test were performed to confirm the most appropriate model. When book leverage and 
MBR were used as response and predictor variable respectively, Hausman test indicated that 
Random effect model was the most appropriate model and was therefore utilized for the analysis.  
4.3.1.5 Random effect with book leverage and MBR 
When applying random effect model, deviations across firms are believed to be haphazard and 
without any relationship with independent variables unlike fixed effects model. This model is 
used when variations across firms are believed to influence the response variable. Table 4.5 
presents outcomes of  Random-effects GLS regression. 
 
market lev. MBR Prof Risk inflation yield spreadCo. size PPE liquidity market Co. growth interest rates
Market lev. Pearson Correlation 1
MBR Pearson Correlation -.430** 1
Prof Pearson Correlation -.637** .779** 1
Risk Pearson Correlation -.797** 0.222 .581** 1
Inflation Pearson Correlation 0.013 -0.138 0.063 0.076 1
yield spread Pearson Correlation 0.002 0.074 0.05 0.002 -.335** 1
Co. size Pearson Correlation -0.067 .701** .652** 0.1 -0.085 0.041 1
PPE Pearson Correlation -.436** .309** .550** .463** 0.051 0.016 .413** 1
Liquidity Pearson Correlation -.339** -.340** -0.161 .281* -0.06 0.14 -.459** 0.168 1
Market Pearson Correlation -0.068 -0.104 -0.06 0.03 -.404** -0.156 -0.157 0.011 0.054 1
Co. growth Pearson Correlation -.430** 1.000** .779** 0.222 -0.138 0.074 .701** .309** -.340** -0.104 1
interest rates Pearson Correlation -.590** 0.129 .364** .540** 0.097 -.424** 0.065 .555** .297* -0.005 0.129 1
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
market leverage-corporate debt issues
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Table 4.5: Random-effects GLS regression with Book Leverage and MBR 
 
In reference to outcome in table 4.5, coefficient of determination values (R2s) within, between 
and the overall were established to be 24.36%, 54.26% and 60.88% respectively. The coefficient 
of determination (R2) generally shows the change of response variable explained by change in 
predictor variable. MBR coefficient was established as statistically significant with a p-value of 
0.000. MBR had a positive correlation with book leverage. The study thus concluded that MBR 
,the proxy for market timing statistically and significantly influenced book leverage. A result 
consistent with Bougatef & Chichti, (2010)whose findings indicate that MBR positively 
influenced equity issues. Test results suggest listed firms tendency to raise external equity when 
they are highly valued by the market. Managers in these companies recognize that their stocks 
are highly valued and as a result try to take advantage of these overvaluations. This evidence 
concurs with Alti, (2006);Baker & Wurgler, (2002); Graham & Harvey, (2001) arguments 
whereby companies exploit opportunities for financing and float securities on noticing that their 
securities are highly priced by the market. The result contradicts a study by Mahajan & 
Tartaroglu, (2008) who established a negative correlation for G-7 countries although this 
relationship could not be attributed to equity market timing. 
 
Book Leverage Coef Std. Err. z p>|t|
lower Upper
MBR 0.4188705 0.07257 5.77 0.000 0.001 0.5611019




                      Max = 11
Wald chi2(1)  =      33.32
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2  =    0.0000
95% CI
.75724822    (fraction of variance due to u_i)
R-sq:  within = 0.2436                         Number of obs =  85
       between = 0.5426                                       Number of groups =   13
            overall = 0.6088                                       Obs per group: min =  1.0
                      Avg =  6.5
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4.3.1.6 Panel Regression with Book Leverage, MBR and Control Variables 
In this section, a panel regression model is fitted with Book leverage as response variable, MBR 
as explanatory variable and Control variables namely: Profitability, Risk, Inflation, Yield Spread, 
company size, PPE, Liquidity, Market, Company growth and Interest rate. Fixed and random 
effects model were fitted, with the best model being chosen. Hausman test confirmed random 
effect model as the most appropriate model and was therefore adopted.  
4.3.1.7 Random Effects model with Book Leverage, MBR and Control Variables 
Table 4.6 shows test results for the Random-effects GLS regression. 
Table 4.6: Random Effects model with Book Leverage, MBR and Control Variables 
 
Book Leverage Coef Std. Err. z p>|t|
lower Upper
MBR 0.3298 0.0817 4.04 0.000 0.1696 0.4900
PROFITABILITY -0.9797 0.2545 -3.81 0.000 -.1.4696 0.4719
RISK -0.6843 0.5123 -1.34 0.000 -1.4696 0.01744
INFLATION 0.0066 .0055. 1.99 0.233 -0.0042 .0315.
YIELDSPREAD 0.0134 0.0092 0.0092 1.450 0.148 0.0315
COMPANYSIZE 0.068 0.0141 4.8 0.000 0.0402 0.0959
PPE -0.3589 0.0951 -3.77 0.000 -0.5455 0.1723
LIQUIDITY -0.0168 0.04 -0.42 0.673 -0.0953 0.0615
MARKET -0.0178 0.0701 -0.25 0.800 -0.1552 0.1196
COMPANYGROWTH 0 0mitted
INTERESTRATE 0.0044 0.0068 0.65 0.517 -0.009 0.0179





0      (fraction of variance due to u_i)
                   Avg =8.8
                   Max = 7.5
Wald chi2(10) = 321.23
corr(u_i, X)  = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2  =   0..000
R-sq:  within = 0.4211 Number of obs =  83
           between = 0.8787 Number of groups=11
            overall = 0.8169 Obs per group:
                   min =  3
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From test results in table 4.6, the coefficients of determination values (R2s) were within, 
42.11%, between, 87.87% and overall the model was found to explain 81.69% of the variances in 
book leverage. Further the findings showed that MBR, profitability, risk, company size and PPE 
significantly influenced Book leverage as indicated by significant p-values of 0.000 for the 
variables. The other variables were found to be insignificant as their p-values were greater than 
0.05. Profitability, Risk, PPE, liquidity and market negatively impact on book leverage whereas 
MBR, inflation, yield spread, company size and interest rates had positive impact on book 
leverage.  
MBR and book leverage were established to exhibit a positive association demonstrating that 
MBR positively influences equity offerings. A finding consistent with Bougatef & Chichti, 
(2010) whose findings indicate that MBR positively impacted equity issues. These results 
suggest companies are inclined to source external equity when they highly valued by the market. 
Managers in these companies notice that their stocks are highly priced by the market and as a 
result try to exploit these overvaluations. This finding concurs with Alti, (2006);Baker & 
Wurgler, (2002); Graham & Harvey, (2001) who assert companies will exploit opening windows 
for financing and offer securities when they recognize their securities to be highly valued by the 
market. A result which contradicts the study by Mahajan & Tartaroglu, (2008) who established a 
negative correlation for G-7 countries which could not be ascribed to equity market timing. 
Profitability is negatively correlated with book leverage, a result that concurs with pecking order 
prediction, Myers & Majluf, (1984) that lucrative companies have lower leverage ratios as they 
choose to fund their investments internally. A negative association is established between risk 
and book leverage as the study anticipated since the riskier a company is the lower would be its 
leverage levels. Tangibility is negatively correlated with book leverage implying that as level of 
tangible assets in a company grows the higher would be its collateral value making it easier for 
companies to borrow from the market than their counterparts with lower leverage. Liquidity was  
negatively correlated with book leverage meaning higher liquidity levels in a firm would result in 
lower the leverage levels which concurs with pecking order theory by  Myers, (1984) hypotheses 
that company’s will use internally generated finances before turning to other sources of funds. 
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Market which is a proxy for market performance has a negative sign indicating stock market  
performance will stimulate equity issuance driving equity levels up and leverage levels down 
hence the negative association between market and book leverage. Findings concur with 
windows of opportunity theory by  Lucas & McDonald, (1990) who posit  abnormal positive 
stock returns and an abnormal rise in the market precede equity issuances. Inflation positively 
influences book leverage. If inflation levels are high investors will have less disposable income 
therefore will not invest in a company’s shares making companies to turn to debt financing, 
supporting the market timing proposition that companies will turn to the most favourable source 
of financing. Yield spread influences the decision for firms to offer debt and hence the direct 
impact on leverage levels in a firm. 
Large firms have a higher propensity, capacity and ability to use debt in their capital structure 
hence positive relationship between company size and book leverage. Interest rates are positively 
correlated with book leverage. This means that if interest rates have been rising or are expected 
to rise companies will issue more debt now hence increasing, their leverage levels. This evidence 
shows that firms will raise capital now to avoid future unfavourable market conditions. 
4.4 Panel Regression with Market Leverage and MBR 
In this section, a panel regression model was fitted with market leverage and MBR as the 
response variable and the predictor variable respectively. Pooled OLS, fixed and random effects 
models were fitted from which the best model was selected. The Hausman test confirmed the 
fixed effect model as the appropriate model and hence embraced. 
4.4. 1 Fixed Effects model with Market Leverage and MBR 
Table 4.7 presents the fixed effects model results which indicated that the coefficient of 
determination values (R2s) were within 28.25%, between, 0.11% and the overall   0.51% of the 
changes in market leverage were found to be influenced by MBR. The ANOVA indicated the 
model was statistically significant with a p-value of 0.000. MBR was found statistically 
significantly negatively influence market leverage, a finding concurring with findings of  Baker 
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& Wurgler, (2002) who established  that leverage had a strong negative correlation with their 
measure of historical market valuations. It conforms with the findings  of Alti, (2006) who 
established that market timing influences the funding activities of companies which results in 
short term variations from leverage targets. Further agreement with findings are established in a 
study by Moyo, (2016) who confirmed a significant negative correlation between leverage and 
MBR which the study argued confirms validity of market timing theory. 
Table 4.7: Fixed Effects model with Market Leverage and MBR 
 
Market Leverage Coef Std. Err. t p>|t|
lower Upper
MBR -0.387388 0.073262 -5.29 0.000 0.5334682 0.2413082
sigma_u 18343345
sigma_e 0.0840002
rho  .82664951 fraction of variance due to u_i)
F test that all u_i=0:                  F(12, 71)=    19.76                         Prob > F = 0.0000
_Cons 1.119279 0.071137 15.73 0.000 0.977436 1.261122
                   Max = 11
F(1,71)       =      27.96
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.6038 Prob > F       =    0.0000
95% CI
R-sq:  within = 0.2825                         Number of obs =  85
        between = 0.0011 Number of groups = 13
             overall = 0.0051 Obs per group: min = 1




Figure 2.0: Fixed effects: Heterogeneity across the Companies 
Figure 2.0 shows heterogeneity in Market leverage across the different companies. 
4.4.2 Panel Regression with Market Leverage, MBR and Control Variables 
A panel regression model was fitted with Market leverage as response variable, MBR as  
independent variable and control variables namely: Profitability, risk, inflation, yield spread, 
company size, PPE, liquidity, market, company growth and interest rate. Random and fixed 
effects models were fitted from which the best model was chosen. This was done using Hausman 
test which confirmed the random effect was the most appropriate model.  















Table 4.8: Random Effects model with Market Leverage, MBR and Control Variables 
 
Test results presented in Table 4.8 show that coefficient of determination values (R2s) were 
within 43.72%, between,63.14%  and overall were the model was found to explain50.70% of the 
variations in market leverage. The test results further indicated that MBR, profitability, company 
size and PPE statistically and significantly influenced market leverage as indicated by significant 
p-values of 0.000 for each of the variables respectively. MBR, profitability, risk and PPE were 
negatively correlated with market leverage whereas inflation, yield spread, company size, 
liquidity, market and interest rates had a positive association with market leverage. MBR was 
found to be statistically significantly negatively correlated with market leverage, concurring with 
findings of a study by Moyo, (2016) who established that MBR was significantly negatively 
correlated with leverage. A result found to validate market timing theory. It conforms with Baker 
Market Leverage Coef Std. Err. z p>|t|
lower Upper
MBR -0.4154 0.0887 -4.68 0.000 -0.5893 0.2416
PROFITABILITY -1.0204 0.2762 -3.69 0.000 -1.5618 0.4789
RISK -0.5877 0.556 -1.06 0.291 -1.6775 5022
INFLATION 0.0087 0.006 1.46 0.143 -0.0029 0.0205
YIELDSPREAD 0.0157 0.01 1.57 0.117 -0.0039 0.0355
COMPANYSIZE 0.0854 154 5.55 0.000 0.0552 0.1156
PPE -0.4145 0.1033 -4.01 0.000 -0.617 0.212
LIQUIDITY 0.0249 0.0434 0.57 0.567 -0.06027 0.11
MARKET 0.02475 0.0761 0.33 0.745 -0.1244 0.11
COMPANYGROWTH 0
INTERESTRATE 0.0038 0.0074 0.51 0,608 -0.0108 0.1739
_Cons -0.8571 0.40307 -2.13 0.033 -1.6471 0.18517
sigma_u 0
sigma_e 0.0605
rho 0      (fraction of variance due to u_i)
              Avg =  7.5
              Max = 11
Wald chi2(10)=  74.05
corr(u_i, X)  = 0 (assumed) Prob> chi2 =    0.0000
95% CI
R-sq:  within = 0.4372 Number of obs =  83
           between = 0.6314 Number of groups =11
            overall = 0.5070 Obs per group:
              min =  3
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& Wurgler, (2002) study on market timing and capital structure where their historical market 
valuations measure ,MBR was found to be strongly negatively related to leverage. The results 
agrees with  results of Setyawan, (2015) who established MBR had a negative effect on market 
leverage.  
Profitability was found to statistically significantly negatively relate with market leverage. A 
finding which supports the pecking order theory, Myers & Majluf, (1984) prediction that 
lucrative companies leverage ratios are lower since they fund their investments from within. Risk 
was negatively related with market leverage. Risky firms have a higher risk premium attached to 
their stock prices by the market which makes their shares unaffordable to investors. As a result, 
these firms are unable to raise funds required for investments through equity offering since 
conditions in the market are unfavourable. This is consistent with market timing theory in which 
corporate executives maintain their ability to time the markets when conditions existing these 
market allow (Baker & Wurgler, 2002). Market leverage and PPE are negatively related. High 
tangible asset levels allow firms to fund their investments with debt hence the negative 
association between PPE and market leverage. 
A positive relationship exists between market leverage and inflation. Increases in inflation make 
purchasing power to decline. Due to inflation, share prices decline making the shares appealing 
to investors creating favourable market condition for companies to offer equity hence the 
increase in leverage ratios of listed companies. A result that conforms with market timing theory 
Baker & Wurgler, (2002) who asserts companies should offer equity or debt if conditions 
existing in the market are favourable. 
Yield spread is positively related with market leverage. When yield spread is quite high firms 
would prefer to offer equity than debt to fund their investments until debt market conditions 
becomes favourable. The practice of market timing is established where managers of listed firms 
look at the over or under valuation of their securities when making their financing decisions. 
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Company size and market leverage are positively correlated. Companies that are large owing to  
agency costs which are lower, cash flows that are less volatile and ease of access to capital 
markets embrace more debt.  
Liquidity is statistically insignificantly positively related to market leverage. Highly liquid firms 
would utilise the funds in their custody before they can utilise external funding except in 
circumstances where managers exploit opening financing windows and issue equity. This finding 
confirms managers exploiting timing opportunities in the equity market. 
Market leverage and market have a positive relation. If performance of the capital market or 
conditions existing in the market are favourable firms will respond by issuing more equity 
supporting market timing hypotheses. Doukas et al., (2011) established that when capital markets 
were perceived as conducive an indicator of market timing and equity adverse selection costs 
were important considerations that influenced certain companies to offer more debt in hot than in 
cold-debt market periods. 
A positive relationship was established between interest rates and market leverage meaning that 
interest rates that are rising or anticipated to rise compel companies to issue more debt now 
aimed at circumventing unfavourable debt market conditions, a finding that concurs with market 
timing theory. 
4.5 Analysis of Corporate Debt 
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics – corporate debt 
Table 4.9 presents descriptive statistics of study variables. These include mean, standard 





Table 4.9: Descriptive Statistics-corporate debt 
 
The table shows that there were 71 observations for each variable. 
4.5.2: Stationarity Test 
Stationarity test was performed using the Fisher-type unit-root test based on ADF tests. Test 
outcomes indicated that MBR, profitability, inflation, PPE, liquidity, market, company growth 
and interest rate panels were stationary. The other variables panels were found to contain unit 
roots and hence not stationary. This test results can be found in appendix VI. 
4.5.3: Panel Regression with Book Leverage and MBR 
Random effects, fixed effects and pooled OLS models were run on the data. Hausman test 
confirmed random effect model to be the most suitable model to run the regression analysis.  
4.5.4. Random Effects with Book Leverage and MBR 
Table 4.10 presents random effect model test outcomes. 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max N
Book Leverage 0.6033 0.2907 0.0475 1.0134 71
Market Leverage 0.5841 0.2940 0.0608 ‘9831065 71
MBR 1.2466 1.0007 0.2799 5.0291 71
Profitability 0.1003 0.1133 0.0188 0.4536 71
Risk 0.0324 0.0311 0.0030 0.0904 71
Inflation 7.6338 2.8902 4.1000 15.1000 71
Yield spread 3.5742 2.5582 -1.6340 -1.6340 71
Company Size 23.2872 1.1801 20.9641 25.9998 71
PPE 0.2516 0.3213 0.0020 0.9023 71
Liquidity 1.3252 1.0200 0.4650 5.1900 71
Market -0.0241 0.2224 -0.3533 0.3650 71
Company growth 1.2466 1.0007 0.2799 5.0291 71
Interest rate 12.4390 5.0416 1.1800 19.7300 71
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Table 4.10: Random-effects GLS regression with Book Leverage and MBR 
 
Table 4.10 results indicate coefficient of determination values (R2s) were within 1.11%, between, 
1.56% and overall  the model was found to explain 0.54% of the variations in the book leverage. 
The coefficient for MBR was found to be statistically insignificant as it had a p-value of 0.507. 
Therefore, MBR insignificantly negatively influences book leverage. A test result that 
contradicts Baker & Wurgler,( 2002) findings that their measure of historical market valuation, 
MBR was strongly negatively related to leverage and Moyo,(2016) who established a significant 
negative correlation between leverage and MBR which was interpreted as a confirmation of 
market timing. 
4.5.5 Panel Regression with Book Leverage, MBR and Control Variables 
In this section, a panel regression model was fitted with Book leverage as response variable, 
MBR as predictor variable and control variables namely: Profitability, Risk, Inflation, Yield 
Spread, company size, PPE, Liquidity, Market, Company growth and Interest rate. Random and 
fixed effects models were fitted to the data from which the best model was chosen. Hausman test 
confirmed random effect model was most suitable to use and was therefore adopted.  
Book Leverage Coef Std. Err. z p>|t|
lower Upper
MBR -0.0137261 0.0206971 -0.66 0.507 -0.0542917 0.0268395




Min =  2.0
                     Max = 10
Wald chi2(1)  =      0.44
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2  =    0.5072
95% CI
  .90544639       (fraction of variance due to u_i)
R-sq:  within =  0.0111                                               Number of obs =  71
  between =  0.0156                                        Number of groups = 12
            overall =  0.0054 Obs per group: 
                     Avg =  5.9
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4.5.6 Random Effects model with Book Leverage, MBR and Control Variables 
Table 4.11 shows test results for Random-effects GLS regression. 
Table 4.11: Random Effects model with Book Leverage, MBR and Control Variables 
 
As depicted in table 4.11, coefficients of determination values (R2s) were within 10.02%, 
between, 91.18% and overall  the  model was found to explain 87.42% of the changes in book 
leverage. Further the findings indicated that profitability, risk, company size, PPE and Interest 
rate significantly influenced Book leverage as indicated by their significant p-values. The other 
variables were found to be insignificant as their p-values were greater than 0.05. Profitability, 
risk, yield spread, PPE, liquidity and interest rates were found to negatively influence book 
leverage whereas MBR, inflation, company size and market were found to positively impact 
book leverage. 
MBR is positively related with book leverage indicating a positive influence on equity issues 
which is consistent with Bougatef & Chichti, (2010).These results suggest companies are 
Book Leverage Coef Std. Err. z p>|t|
lower Upper
MBR 0.0297702 0.0263393 1.13                 0.258 -0.0218539 0.081394
PROFITABILITY -0.7416271 0.3097387 -2.39                 0.017 -1.348704 -0.1345504
RISK -3.974848 0.749711 -5.3 0.000 -5.444255 -2.505441
INFLATION 0.0061117 0.0065349 0.94                 0.350 -0.0066964 0.0189199
YIELDSPREAD -0.0050011 0.0078402 -0.64                 0.524 -0.0203675 0.0103654
COMPANYSIZE 0.1283692 0.0225037 5.7 0.000 0.0842629 0.1724756
PPE -0.2046356 0.0718088 -2.85                 0.004 -0.3453784 -0.0638929
LIQUIDITY -0.0202204 0.0176442 -1.15                 0.252 -0.0548024 0.0143616
MARKET 0.0251039 0.0765165 0.33                 0.743 -0.1248658 0.175074




rho .0808452    (fraction of variance due to u_i)
_Cons -2.008729 0.5562755 -3.61  0.000 -3.099009
95% CI
                  Avg = 5.9
                  Max = 10
Wald chi2(10)= 272.11
corr(u_i, X)  = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 =    0.0000
R-sq:  within = 0.1002 Number of obs =  71
           between = 0.9118 Number of groups =12
            overall = 0.8742 Obs per group:
                  min =  2.0
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inclined to raise external equity when they are overvalued by the market. Corporate executives in 
these firms recognize that their stocks are highly priced by market and as a result they try to take 
advantage of these overvaluations. This evidence conforms with findings of Alti, (2006);Baker & 
Wurgler, (2002);Graham & Harvey, (2001) that companies exploit opening windows for 
financing and offer securities when they notice their securities to be overvalued by the market. 
The result contradicts Mahajan & Tartaroglu, (2008) study which established negative relation 
for G-7 which could not be ascribed to equity market timing. 
Profitability is negatively related with book leverage supporting pecking order, Myers & Majluf, 
(1984) prediction that lucrative companies exhibit lower leverage ratios due to their preference to 
fund investments internally. Risk and book leverage are negatively related. Risky companies 
have lower leverage levels. Book leverage and yield spread are negatively related. When yield 
spread is quite high firms would prefer to issue equity to fund their investments and hence 
depressed book leverage levels hence the negative relationship between book leverage and yield 
spread. This relationship supports market timing in which managers would issue the form of 
financing whose market conditions are favourable. In this case the managers are avoiding the 
unfavourable market conditions in the debt market. 
 Tangibility was negatively related with book leverage meaning that high levels of tangible assets 
increase collateral value and therefore firms can borrow more easily than those with lower 
leverage. Liquidity was negatively related with book leverage meaning high liquidity levels in a 
firm would result in lower leverage levels concurring with pecking order theory, Myers, (1984) 
which hypothesizes companies first utilize internally generated funds, before seeking other 
sources. Interest rates were established to be negatively related with book leverage implying that 
when interest rates are high or rising, companies will offer equity lowering book leverage ratio 
consistent with debt market timing in which corporate executives offer debt when market interest 
rates are low. These findings concurs with ,Henderson et al., (2006) who established that the 
amount of debt issued and interest rates levels were negatively related in the studied countries. 
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Market which is a proxy for market performance has an insignificant positive sign which implies 
that performance of the stock market will stimulate debt issuance which concurs with the market 
timing theory since an improved performance in equity market should not drive companies to 
issue debt. This contradicts Lucas & McDonald, (1990) study who posit that abnormal positive 
share return and abnormal rise in the market precede equity issuances.  Inflation positively 
influences book leverage. If inflation levels are high investors will have less disposable income 
therefore, they will not invest in a company’s shares. This will drive share prices down. This 
creates an unfavourable market condition for firms to issue equity hence firms will turn to debt 
hence increasing the book leverage ratios of the listed firms. A finding conforming to market 
timing theory, Baker & Wurgler,(2002) who asserted that companies should offer debt or stock 
when conditions in the market are favourable. 
Yield spread influences the decision for firms to offer debt and the direct impact on leverage 
levels in a firm. Large firms are more inclined, coupled with capability and capacity to utilise 
debt in capital structure decisions resulting in a positive relation between company size and book 
leverage.  
4.6 Panel Regression with Market Leverage and MBR 
In this section, a panel regression model was fitted with market leverage and MBR as response 
and predictor variables respectively. Pooled OLS, fixed and random effects models were fitted, 
from which the best model was chosen. Hausman test confirmed random effect model was the 
most suitable model to use and was therefore adopted. 
4.6.1 Random Effects Model with Market Leverage and MBR 





Table 4.12: Random Effects model with Market Leverage and MBR 
 
Table 4.12 results show that, coefficient of determination values (R2s) were within 1.11%, 
between, 1.56% and the overall were the model was found to explain 0.54% of the variations in 
market leverage. MBR coefficient was statistically significant with a p-value of 0.000. To 
conclude MBR had a statistically significant negative association with market leverage. This 
conforms with, Baker & Wurgler, (2002) findings that a strongly negatively correlation existed 
between leverage and their market timing measure. It concurs with, Alti, (2006) findings that 
market timing shapes funding activities of companies leading to short run variations from target 
leverage levels. The results agrees with  the findings of Moyo, (2016) who established a 
significant negative correlation between leverage and MBR which they argue confirms validity 
of market timing theory. 
4.6.2 Panel Regression with Market Leverage, MBR and Control Variables 
Random and fixed effects model were fitted to the regression model ,market leverage being the 
dependent variable, MBR as independent variable and control variables from which the best 
model was chosen. Hausman test established fixed effect model was more satisfactory and was 








rho .88266694 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
0.8621726_Cons 0.7092181 0.078039 9.09 0.556263
                  Avg = 5.9
                   Max = 10
Wald chi2(1)=     15.77
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2    =  0.0001
Coef Std. Err. z p>|t| 95% CI
R-sq:  within =  0.0111                                                Number of obs =  71
      between =  0.0156                                        Number of groups = 12
            overall =  0.0054 Obs per group: 
                  min =  2.0
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4.6.3 Fixed Effects model with Market Leverage, MBR and Control Variables 
Table 4.13 presents the Fixed effects Model with Market leverage being the predictor variable, 
MBR being the independent variable and control variables namely: profitability, risk, inflation, 
yield spread, company size, PPE, liquidity, market, company growth and interest rate.  
Table 4.13: Fixed Effects model with Market Leverage, MBR and Control Variables 
 
Table 4.13 results indicate, coefficient of determination values (R2s) were within 16.96%, 
between,33.62%  and overall were the model was found to explain 18.53% of the variations in 
market leverage. ANOVA a measure of general significance of a model using F-statistic and p-
value, established p-value of the F statistic was 0.0011 implying the model was statistically 
significant. Model test results further indicated that only MBR and company size statistically 
significantly influenced Market leverage as indicated by significant p-values of 0.000 and 0.024 
Market Leverage Coef Std. Err. t p>|t|
lower Upper
MBR -0.1144 0.0227 -5.04 0.000 -0.1615 0.0688
PROFITABILITY 0.5978 0.313 1.91 0.062 -0.0308 1.2266
RISK 0 omitted
INFLATION -0.0026 0.0054 -0.49 0.623 -0.0135 0.0082
YIELDSPREAD -0.00023 0.0068 -0.03 0.972 -0.0138 0.0134
COMPANYSIZE 0.0737 0.0317 2.32 0.024 0.0099 0.1376
PPE -0.146 0.1824 -0.8 0.427 -0.5126 0.2204
LIQUIDITY -0.0256 0.0141 -0.81 0.077 -0.0541 28
MARKET -0.0989 0.0653 -1.52 0.136 -0.2302 0.0322
COMPANYGROWTH 0 omitted
INTERESTRATE -0.00002 0.0059 0 0.996 -0.0118 0.0118





.9281    (fraction of variance due to u_i)
F test that all u_i=0:                        F(11, 50) =    18.93                                  Prob > F = 0.0000
                   Avg = 5.9
                   Max = 10
F(10, 52)      =   11.85
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1885 Prob > F   =    0.0011
R-sq:  within = 0.1696 Number of obs =  71
            between = 0.3362 Number of groups=12
            overall = 0.1853 Obs per group:
                   min =  2.0
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respectively. Other variables were found to be insignificant. MBR, inflation, yield spread, PPE, 
liquidity, market and interest rates were negatively related with market leverage whereas 
company size and profitability were positively related with market leverage. 
MBR was statistically significantly negatively correlated with market leverage, a result that 
conforms with Moyo, (2016) findings that leverage and MBR were significantly negatively 
correlated which the study argued confirms validity of market timing theory. It concurs with 
Baker & Wurgler, (2002) who established a strongly negative correlation between leverage and 
their historical market valuations measure.  
Inflation is insignificantly negatively correlation with market leverage. This is because when 
inflation increases the purchasing power declines. This means investors only focus on consuming 
the essentials and are not in a position to invest in equity of the listed companies generating 
unfavourable market conditions which drive market leverage levels down. This concurs with 
Baker & Wurgler, (2002) findings that companies borrow or offer stock when market conditions 
are favourable. 
Yield spread is negatively correlated with market leverage. When yield spread is quite high firms 
would prefer to offer equity to fund their investments until debt market conditions becomes 
favourable. This drives market leverage levels higher. Once more the practice is market timing is 
established where managers of listed look at the over or under valuation of their securities when 
making their financing decisions. 
PPE was negatively correlated with market leverage. Companies with high levels of tangible 
assets prefer funding investments with debt hence raising their leverage levels. 
Liquidity was negatively correlated with market leverage. Highly liquid firms opt to fund their 
investments internally driving market leverage levels lower. This test results supports, Myers & 
Majluf, (1984) pecking order theory prediction that lucrative companies exhibit lower debt ratios 
due to their preference to fund investments internally. 
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Market was statistically insignificantly negatively related with market leverage. If performance 
of capital market or market existing conditions were favourable firms will respond by issuing 
more equity than debt which is conforms to market timing. This test results contravenes, Doukas 
et al., (2011) findings that when capital markets conditions were perceived to be conducive and 
adverse selection costs of equity ,were important considerations that influenced certain 
companies to offer more debt in hot than in cold-debt market periods. 
Interest rates were statistically insignificantly negatively associated with market leverage. 
Evidence suggests firms will offer debt when interest rates are high contrary to market timing 
theory where high interest rates drive firms to issue equity.  
Profitability had a statistically insignificant positive association with market leverage. This 
supports trade-off theory advocated by Modigliani & Miller, (1963) that a company’s 
profitability may be interpreted to mean firm performance and hence, profitable companies are in 
a position repay  their debt.  
Company size and market leverage are positively related. Large firms agency costs are lower and 
have ease of access to capital markets. Large firms are therefore expected to carry higher debt in 
their capital structure than equity. 
4.7 conclusion on second objective of the study 
The second objective aimed at establishing the relationship that existed if any between market 
timing and capital structure through which MBR which is a proxy and measure of market timing 
was found to influence book and market leverage as follows; A statistically significant negative 
relationship was observed between MBR and market leverage for corporate debt and right 
issuing companies. A statistically significant positive relationship was established for rights 
issuing firms when the model with book leverage was applied with and without control variables. 
Further, a statistically insignificant negative relationship was observed for corporate debt issuing 
firms when book leverage was used as the dependent variable and MBR was used as the 
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independent variable which changes to insignificant positive relationship when the regression 
model including book leverage, MBR and control variables was run.  
4.8 Finance manager’s views with regard to market timing by Companies listed at the NSE 
Third objective of the study aimed at examining finance manager’s views with regard to market 
timing by the listed companies at the NSE. This objective was achieved through a personally 
administered questionnaire to the 21 finance managers of listed companies that issued corporate 
debt and rights issue in the period under review. The questionnaire had closed and open-ended 
questionnaires. The results of the findings as per the questionnaire are discussed as follows; 
4.8.1 Response rate 
The study questionnaires were distributed to the 21 listed companies that issued rights issue and 
corporate debt between 2006 and 2016. 15 completely filled questionnaires were collected back 
and analyzed. The response rate was 71.43%. Previous researchers have argued that 50% 
response rate was sufficient for data analysis(Saunders et al., 2009). Hence, the response rate of 
71.43% was regarded as sufficient for data analysis.  
4.8.2 Demographic characteristics 
4.8.2.1 Level of Education 




Figure 3.0: Level of Education 
Figure 3.0 research findings indicates 52.6% of respondents had attained a graduate education, 
followed by 42.1% who had attained postgraduate education and finally, 5.3% had attained 
diploma education. This implies that all the respondents have high education attainment. The 
level of education was considered since it is an indicator of how informed the finance managers 
are as far as funding choices taken by companies are concerned and the repercussions such 
decisions and their timing would have on capital structure and overall cost of capital for the 
company.  
4.8.2.2 Work Duration 































Figure 4.0: Work Duration 
Results in Figure 5.0 indicate that 47.4% of the respondents have worked in their respective 
companies for 5-10 years, 47.4% indicated 2-5years while 5.3% indicated 0-2 years. This 
indicates a big  proportion of finance managers had been employed for more than 2 years in their 
respective firms. The duration respondents had worked in the company was considered since it 
would indicate the level of experience such managers had in making financing decisions of the 
firm and hence how informed they were in making securities issuance decisions for the firm. 
4.8.3 Type of Financing  
The type of financing utilized by the sample firms outcomes are shown in table 4.14 and Figure 
5.0. 






















Retained earnings 10 27.0% 66.7%
Debt 9 24.3% 60.0%
Equity 15 40.5% 100.0%
Hybrid securities 3 8.1% 20.0%







Figure 5.0: Type of financing 
Results in Table 4.14 and figure 5.0 indicated that out of the 15(100%) companies, 10 (66.7%) 
utilize Retained earnings, 9 (60%) utilize debt, 15 (100%) utilize equity while 3 (20%) utilize 
Hybrid securities. This shows that Equity is the most popular (40.5%) followed by Retained 
earnings (27%) followed by Debt (24.3%) and finally Hybrid securities (8.1%) was the least 
utilized. 
4.8.4 Target Capital Structure  
The respondents were then asked whether their company have an optimal debt-equity mix which 
the company adhered to. Results in Figure 6.0 indicated that 33% of the respondents agreed that 
their company have a target capital structure whereas 67% of the listed companies that raised 
capital through rights issue and corporate debt between 2006 and 2016 do not have an optimal 
debt-equity mix that they adhere to. This means that such companies have a leeway to offer 
equity, debt or both as long as overall cost of capital is minimized. Hence such firms are in a 
position to take advantage of any opening windows for financing when the capital cost for a 
specific source is favourable to the firm and issue such capital. A finding which confirms such 




















Figure 6.0: target capital structure for corporate debt and rights issuing firms 
4.8.5 Equity Market Timing 
Several questions were posed to respondents to rate their agreement levels as pertains equity 
market timing with responses being presented in figure 7.0. 
 





0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
Overvaluation of the company shares
Optimal Capital structure
overvaluation of stock by market
undervaluation of stock by market
performance of capital market
Favourable market conditions
high market to book ratio




The test results presented in the figure 8.0 revealed that overvaluation of company stock by the 
market was the most important factor finance managers put into consideration when issuing 
equity with a mean of 4.368 and a standard deviation of 1.165.Favourable market conditions 
influenced decisions to issue equity was considered the least factor managers put into 
consideration in their decision to issue equity. Overall the respondents highlighted that all the 
factors were important and significant in making the decision to issue equity as indicated by 
means of greater than 3 and standard deviation of close or above 1.0. The average mean was 
3.9023, which implies that a big proportion of respondents concurred with the statements on 
equity market timing. However, the responses were varied as shown by a standard deviation of 
close to 1.0 and above. These responses conform to Graham & Harvey, (2001) findings on an 
anonymous survey targeting CFOs in firms located in US and Canada on cost of capital, capital 
budgeting and capital structure. In the survey,67% of CFOs agreed that under or overvaluation of 
their stock was an essential factor they put into consideration when issuing equity and almost a 
similar number considered the stock price and if it has been on a rise, the price they sold their 
shares at was high. In this survey the price at which shares are trading at were considered  to be 
the top on the list factor  that influenced the choice to issue equity and the most essential 
consideration that influenced the resolution to issue debt. 
 Further agreement with responses are found in a study by Baker & Wurgler, (2000)who argue 
that stock market inefficiency drives the financial policies made by firms such that when shares 
are highly priced, the current stockholders of a firm gain by issuing overvalued shares and debt 
becomes preferred when equity prices are at their lowest. This result contravenes the “irrelevance 
theory” as advanced by Modigliani & Miller, (1958) which implicitly assume market efficiency. 
4.8.6 Debt market timing 




Figure 8.0: Descriptive Results: Debt Market Timing 
From the test results presented in the figure 8.0 revealed that finance managers of the listed firms 
considered interest rates to be the factor that highly influenced their decision to issue corporate 
debt whereas target capital structure was the least with a mean of 3.211 and standard deviation of 
0.855. Overall finance managers highlighted that all the factors were important and significant in 
influencing the decision to issue debt as indicated by means of greater than 3 and standard 
deviation of close or above 1.0. The average mean was 3.566, which implies that a big 
proportion respondents agreed with statements on debt market timing. However, the responses 
were varied as shown by a standard deviation of 0.989 which is close to 1.0. These responses 
concur with an anonymous survey by Graham & Harvey, (2001) who sought to establish whether 
CFOs timed interest rates by offering debt when they felt that market interest rates were 
particularly low. Moderately strong evidence of such market timing of interest rates was 
observed.  
4.8.7 Triangulation of secondary data and primary data 
Primary and secondary data established presence of market timing by firms offering securities as 
shown in table 4.15. 
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
Interest rates
pricing of the security(Debt)
Target Capital structure
performance of money market




Table 4.15: Triangulation of primary and secondary data 
 
Triangulation of primary and secondary data results presented in the table 4.15 indicate a 
consistency level of 81.82% was obtained from both data with 9 out of 11 variables having a 
consistent effect on market timing. The finance managers indicated that overvaluation of 
company shares by the market was the most important factor they considered in their decision to 
issue equity. If shares are highly valued by market, then stock returns of companies will 
deteriorate after equity issuance as market corrects itself. This concurs with reviewed literature in 
which performance of firms stocks deteriorate after such issue which is consistent with market 
timing. This results agree with Ritter, (1991) findings that offering companies underperformed 
matching firms from the listing date to their 3-year anniversaries. Further conformity is 
established in Spiess & Affleck-Graves, (1995) findings that SEO post offering performance is 
quite similar to that of IPOs. They established that the median return in the 5-year period post the 
offering was 10%  for issuers compared to 42.3% of similar size, non-issuing firms in the same 
industry. Finance managers indicated that high MBR influenced their decision to issue equity. 
This finding concurs with secondary data where MBR is found to statistically and significantly 
influence both market and book leverage. Market timing hypothesis that equity issuers ought to 
have a higher MBR than debt issuers. These findings concur with Baker & Wurgler, (2002) 
findings that high leverage firms were those that raised capital during periods when their MBR 
were high and low leverage firms raised capital when their MBR were low. Logical to this 
Primary data Mean standard dev. Secondary data
Overvaluation of the company shares by market 3.842 0.958 presence of market timing stock returns consistency
Optimal Capital structure 4.421 1.169 absence of market timing No optimal capital structure inconsistency
overvaluation of stock by market 4.368 1.165 presence of market timing stock returns consistency
undervaluation of stock by market 4.211 1.316 presence of market timing stock returns consistency
performance of capital market 3.158 1.537 presence of market timing performance of capital market consistency
Favourable market conditions 3.053 1.615 presence of market timing favourable market conditions consistency
high market to book ratio 4.263 1.195 presence of market timing MBR consistency
Interest rates 3.9023 1.279 presence of market timing interest rates consistency
pricing of the security(Debt) 3.789 0.976 presence of market timing pricing of security consistency
Optimal  Capital structure 3.632 1.116 absence of market timing No optimal capital structure inconsistency
performance of money market 3.211 0.855 presence of market timing Market performance consistency




findings is a study by Hovakimian, (2006) whose results suggest that equity issuer are timed to 
periods of high MBR. 
Finance managers further agree to have an optimal capital structure that they adhere to which 
contradicts the presence of market timing result presented by the secondary data and reviewed 
literature in which optimal capital structure does not exist Baker & Wurgler,(2002). It conforms 
to Moyo,(2016) findings that financial services firms quoted at the JSE had optimal capital 
structures that they adhered to. Finally, finance managers indicated that conditions existing in 
capital markets and money markets influenced their decision to issue equity. This response 
concurs to Lucas & McDonald, (1990) finding that equity issuances are preceded on average by 
an abnormal positive share return and an abnormal rise in the market.  
Finance managers further indicated that they issue debt when interest rates were low prior to 
their increase. Stock returns of corporate debt issuing firms indicate an underperformance of 
securities issuing firms when compared to similar size non-issuing firms suggesting that 
corporate executives issue their debt when prevailing interest rates are low and as the market 
corrects itself this leads to lower stock returns for such firms. A response that concurs with 
Graham & Harvey, (2001);Bancel & Mittoo,(2004) findings that CFOs and managers claim that 
they actively attempt to time debt markets by making their debt issuances decisions and pick 
opportune moments to make such issues when interest rates are quite low. Further confirmation 
is found in Henderson et al.,(2006) findings that firms time both long term debt and short term 
debt to coincide with low contemporaneous rates. 
Pricing of the debt security is another important factor that finance managers look at when 
making corporate debt issuances. This means that they pick opportune market times when debt is 
highly valued, or stock is lowly valued by the market to issue debt. This result concurs once 
more with the stock return results of the corporate debt issuing firms which recorded 
underperformed when compared to similar size non-issuing firms. This results concur with 
Marsh, (1982) findings that companies are heavily influenced by market conditions and past 
history of security prices in choosing between equity and debt. 
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Hence, the study concludes that the finance managers have similar views on market timing as 
presented by the secondary data and this affirms the presence of market timing in issuance of 
rights issue and corporate debt by listed companies at the NSE. 
4.9 Conclusion 
The third objective sought to establish the finance manager’s views with regard to market timing 
by the listed companies at the NSE. The finance managers perceived overvaluation or 
undervaluation of their company shares by the market to be important factors they put into 
consideration in making their decision to issue equity which conforms to market timing theory. 
Finance managers agreed that performance of capital market and conditions existing in the 
market influenced their decision to issue equity which concurs with equity market timing. They 
also concurred with statements that high market valuations as indicated by high MBR influenced 
their resolution to issue equity which is in agreement with  Bougatef & Chichti, (2010) findings. 
Bougatef & Chichti, (2010) established that Tunisian and French companies exploited market 
timing when raising capital. They would offer equity when the market overpriced their stocks 
and after market performance improvement by exploiting this temporary overvaluation through 
issuance of equity. These findings conform with Baker & Wurgler,(2002) windows of 
opportunity  theory. 
Further, corporate executives agreed to offer corporate debt when prevailing interest rates were 
low before their increase concurring with debt market timing hypotheses. Finance managers 
agreed that pricing of corporate debt was a paramount consideration that influenced their 
decision to issue it to the investing public. They also indicated that the performance of money 
markets also influenced their decision to issue corporate debt. These responses concur with an 
anonymous survey by Graham & Harvey, (2001) who sought to find out whether CFOs timed 
interest rates by offering debt when they felt that market interest rates were particularly low. 




4.10. Chapter summary 
The study analyzed both primary and secondary data at the same time then their results were 
triangulated. In an attempt to ensure that the analysis did not produce spurious results, diagnostic 
tests were carried out on secondary data. The study objectives were tested and discussed. 
Reliability of primary data was tested using the Cronbach’s alpha test.  
The study focused on three main objectives. The first objective achieved through an event study 
methodology which indicated that the securities issuing firms underperformed their size matched 
non-issuing companies an indicator that corporate debt and rights issuing firms market time 
when making their financing decisions. The second objective aimed at establishing the 
relationship that existed if any between market timing and capital structure through which MBR 
which is a proxy and measure of market timing was found to influence book and market leverage 
as follows; A statistically significant negative relationship was observed between MBR and 
market leverage for corporate debt and right issuing companies. A statistically significant 
positive relationship was established for rights issuing firms when the model with book leverage 
was applied with and without control variables. Further, a statistically insignificant negative 
relationship was observed for corporate debt issuing firms when book leverage was used as the 
dependent variable and MBR was used as the independent variable which changes to 
insignificant positive relationship when the regression model including book leverage, MBR and 
control variables was run.  
The third objective aimed at examining the finance manager’s views with regard to market 
timing by the listed firms at the NSE. Consistent with the secondary data firm managers are 
found to use market timing when issuing both corporate debt and rights issue. This results affirm 
the first perspective from which market timing theory can viewed from, Baker & Wurgler,( 
2002) which involves identification of the existence of market timing in configuration of capital 
structures of firms. This perspective aimed at identifying whether windows of opportunities were 
exploited by companies in issuance of securities. Study results were inconsistent with Modigliani 
& Miller, (1958) “irrelevance theory” in which market efficiency was assumed. However, if 
96 
 
stock markets are inefficient which is sometimes the case financing policy becomes relevant 
(Baker & Wurgler, 2000). When equity is highly priced by the market, current owners of 
company will gain by selling overvalued equity and when equity is lowly priced, debt becomes 
desirable both of which imply market timing in which managers exploit windows of opportunity 

















  CHAPTER FIVE 
 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
Summary of the findings, conclusion drawn and recommendations that emanate from the study 
are presented in this chapter. Section 5.2 outlines findings discussion as per study objectives; 
conclusions are drawn in section 5.3, whereas study limitations and recommendations for further 
studies are presented in section 5.4 and 5.5 respectively.  
5.2 Summary of Findings 
This study focused on examining presence of market timing in configuration of capital structures 
by listed companies in the NSE. This part of the report provides detailed discussion of findings 
with regard to study objectives which were arrived at, through use of primary and secondary 
data. 
5.2.1 Presence of Market Timing 
The first study objective sought to investigate presence of market timing in securities issuance by 
NSE listed companies. This objective was achieved through an analysis of stock price 
performance by means of an event study methodology that analyzed reaction of stock prices to 
announcement of the security issuance decisions by the listed firms. 
This study focused on the first perspective of market timing theory which entailed confirmation 
of presence of market timing in securities issuance by companies listed at the NSE. The study 
established underperformance by share prices of  the corporate debt and rights issuing firms 
listed at the NSE when compared to those of non-issuing firms of similar size. This result 
concurs with Ritter, (1991) who confirmed an underperformance of CAR for IPO issuing firms 
from their listing date to three year after the IPO issuance. Spiess & Affleck-Graves, (1995) on 
the other hand confirmed post offering underperformance of SEO firms where median return in 
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the 5-year period post SEO was 10.0%, compared with median five-year holding-period return of 
42.3% for similar size and industry, non-issuing firms. Identical underperformance was also 
recorded when offering and control companies were matched on the basis of MBR and size, 
rather than the size and industry classification.  
The findings also concur with Loughran & Ritter, (1995) who established underperformance for 
both IPO and SEO firms relative to firms not issuing 5 years post offering date. Findings from 
the study reveal the average annual return for 5 years post offering is 5% for firms carrying out 
IPOs, and 7% for firms administering SEOs. The study established that the enormity of this poor 
performance was economically significant since based on returns realized; an investor would 
have been required to invest 44% more in the issuers than in non-issuers of similar size to have 
the same level of wealth 5 years post offering date. 
Further poor performance of security issuance is confirmed by Spiess & Affleck-Graves, (1999) 
whose results indicated that 392 straight debt issuers a median sample company performed 
poorly than a similar size  and MBR matched firm by as much as 19% in the 5 years after debt 
issuance while for 400 convertible debt issuers, the median company performed poorly than its 
matched counterpart by as much as 20% in the 5 years post convertible debt issuance, while the 
mean holding-period return for sample companies is 37% less than the mean for matched control 
companies.  
Kruskal Wallis test results presented in appendix V and VI established that all categories of 
companies recorded statistically significant difference in  both pre CAR and post CAR all with 
P_values of 0.000 except for the category with the pair of companies 53 and 54 for corporate 
debt issuers which recorded statistically insignificant differences in their pre and post CAR. The 
study therefore concluded that the variance in the means of the CAR pre and post the corporate 
debt and rights issuance were likely due to the securities issuance announcements.Hence, the 
corporate debt and rights issuance announcements had a considerable influence on the share 
prices.This means that the securities issuance announcements acted as signals which they 
affected the share prices of the securities firms.This is because a statistically significant 
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difference in the means before and after rights issue announcement was observed implying the 
announcement had information content which determined the share prices. 
5.2.2 Relationship between Market Timing and Capital Structure 
Second study objective aimed at establishing the association between market timing and capital 
structures for NSE listed companies. Using book leverage as response variable and MBR as  
independent variable, MBR was found to explain 60.88 % of the variations in book leverage. A 
statistically significant positive association was established between MBR and book leverage, 
concurring with Bougatef & Chichti, (2010) findings which indicated MBR to have a positive 
influence on equity issuance. These results suggest companies are inclined to source external 
equity when they are highly priced by the market. Corporate executives in these companies 
recognize their stocks as highly priced and as a result they try to exploit these overvaluations. 
This evidence concurs with findings of Alti, (2006);Baker & Wurgler,(2002); Graham & Harvey, 
(2001) whose arguments are that companies will exploit opening windows for financing and 
issue securities when they are cognisant of their securities being overvalued by the market. The 
result contradicts Mahajan & Tartaroglu, (2008) during G-7 countries study which established a 
negative relationship that could not be attributed to equity market timing. 
 When control variables were added to the regression model, its explanatory power improved 
with 81.69% of total variations in book leverage being explained by the model. Further findings 
from the model revealed MBR, profitability, risk, company size and PPE statistically and 
significantly influence book leverage. Profitability, Risk, PPE, liquidity and market negatively 
impact on book leverage whereas MBR, inflation, yield spread, company size and interest rates 
had positively impact on book leverage.  
MBR and book leverage were found to exhibit a positive association demonstrating that MBR 
positively influences equity offerings. A finding consistent with Bougatef & Chichti, (2010) 
whose findings indicate that MBR positively impacted equity issues. These results suggest 
companies are inclined to source for external equity when they were highly valued by the 
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market. Managers in these companies notice that their stocks are highly priced by the market and 
as a result try to exploit these overvaluations. These finding concur with Alti, (2006);Baker & 
Wurgler,(2002); Graham & Harvey, (2001) who assert companies will exploit opening windows 
for financing and offer securities when they recognize their securities to be highly valued by the 
market. A result which contradicts ,Mahajan & Tartaroglu, (2008) study that observed negative 
correlation for G-7 countries but showed the negative association could not be ascribed to equity 
market timing. 
Profitability is negatively correlated with book leverage, concurring with pecking order, Myers 
& Majluf, (1984) prediction that lucrative companies have lower leverage ratios as they choose 
to fund their investments internally. Risk and book leverage are negatively correlated as 
anticipated by the study since the riskier a company is the lower would be its leverage levels. 
Tangibility is negatively correlated with book leverage implying that high levels of tangible 
assets increases collateral value making it easier for firms to borrow from the market than their 
counterparts with lower leverage. Liquidity was negatively  correlated with book leverage 
meaning higher liquidity levels in a firm would result in lower the leverage levels which concurs 
with pecking order theory, Myers, (1984) hypothesizing the use of internally generated funds 
before seeking other sources of funds. 
Market which is a proxy for market performance has a negative sign which indicating stock  
market performance will stimulate equity issuance driving equity levels up and leverage levels 
down. The finding concurs with windows of opportunity theory by  Lucas & McDonald, (1990) 
who posit  abnormal positive stock returns and an abnormal rise in the market precede equity 
issuances. Inflation positively influences book leverage. If inflation levels are high investors will 
have less disposable income therefore will not invest in a company’s shares making companies 
to turn to debt financing, supporting market timing hypothesis that companies will seek the most 
favourable source of financing. Yield spread influences the decision for firms to offer debt and 
hence the direct impact on leverage levels in a firm. 
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Large firms have a propensity, coupled with capability and capacity to utilise debt in their capital 
structure hence positive association between book leverage  and company size. Interest rates and 
book leverage are positively correlated meaning that if interest rates are rising or expected to rise 
companies will issue more debt now hence increasing their leverage levels. This evidence shows 
that firms will raise capital now to avoid future unfavourable market conditions. 
When market leverage was applied as response variable and MBR as predictor variable, MBR 
was able to explain 0.51% of total variations in market leverage. ANOVA indicated the model 
was statistically significant with a p-value of 0.000. MBR was found statistically significantly 
negatively influence market leverage, a finding that concurs with Baker & Wurgler, (2002) 
results that leverage had a strong negative correlation with their measure of historical market 
valuations. It also conforms with Alti, (2006) findings that market timing shapes funding 
activities resulting in short run variations from leverage targets. Further the results are in 
agreement with those of Moyo, (2016) who established a significant negative correlation 
between leverage and MBR which they argue confirms validity of market timing theory. 
After adding control variables to the regression model, explanatory power improved to explain 
50.70% of the variations in market leverage. MBR, profitability, company size and PPE were 
found to statistically and significantly influence variations in market leverage. MBR, 
profitability, risk and PPE were negatively correlated with market leverage whereas inflation, 
yield spread, company size, liquidity, market and interest rates had a positive association with 
market leverage. MBR was found to be statistically significantly negatively correlated with 
market leverage, consistent with Moyo, (2016) findings that MBR was significantly negatively 
correlated with leverage. A result found to validate market timing theory. It concurs with Baker 
& Wurgler, (2002) study which established that their historical market valuations measure was 
strongly negatively related to leverage. This results agrees with, Setyawan, (2015) findings that 
MBR had a negative effect on market leverage.  
Profitability was observed to be statistically significantly negatively related with market 
leverage. A finding in support of pecking order theory Myers & Majluf, (1984) prediction that 
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profitable firms have lower leverage ratios as they choose to fund their investments internally. 
Risk and market leverage are found to be negatively related. Risky firms have a higher risk 
premium attached to their stock prices by the market which makes their shares unaffordable to 
investors. As a result, these firms are unable to raise investments funds through equity issuance 
as market conditions are unfavourable. This is consistent with market timing theory in which 
corporate executives believe they can time markets when conditions existing in these market 
allow (Baker & Wurgler, 2002). Market leverage and PPE are negatively related. Companies 
with high levels of tangible assets fund their investments with debt hence they are in a position to 
raise their leverage levels in book but not in market terms. 
Inflation and market leverage are positively related. Increases in inflation make purchasing 
power to decline. Due to inflation, share prices decline making the shares appealing to investors. 
This creates a favourable market condition for companies to offer equity increasing leverage 
ratios for these listed firms. A result conforming with market timing theory Baker & Wurgler, 
(2002) that firms should borrow or issue stock if the market conditions are favourable. 
Yield spread is positively related with market leverage. When yield spread is quite high firms 
would prefer to offer equity than debt to fund their investments until debt market conditions 
becomes favourable. The practice of market timing is established where managers of listed firms 
look at the over or under valuation of their securities when making their financing decisions. 
Company size and market leverage have a positive correlation. Large companies owing to their 
lower agency costs, cash flows that are less volatile and ease of access to capital markets 
embrace more debt. 
Liquidity is statistically insignificantly positively related to market leverage. Highly liquid firms 
would utilise the funds in their custody before they can utilise external funding except in 
circumstances where managers exploit opening windows for financing and offer equity. This 
finding confirms managers exploit market timing opportunities in the equity market. 
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Market and market leverage have a positive relation. If performance of capital market or existing 
conditions are favourable firms will respond by issuing more equity than debt. Doukas et al., 
(2011) findings that when capital markets were perceived as conducive and adverse selection 
costs of equity were important considerations influencing certain firms to issue more debt in hot 
than in cold-debt market periods. 
Interest rates and market leverage were found to be positively related which means that rising or 
expected to rise interest rates ,will compel companies to issue more debt now in order to 
circumvent unfavourable debt market conditions, a finding concurring with market timing 
theory. 
Corporate debt issuing firms applying regression model with book leverage as response variable 
and MBR as independent variable, MBR was able to explain 0.54% of total variations in book 
leverage. The study concludes that MBR insignificantly negatively influences book leverage. A 
test result that contradicts, Baker & Wurgler,( 2002) findings that their measure of historical 
market valuation, was strongly negatively related to leverage and Moyo,(2016) who established a 
significant negative correlation between leverage and MBR interpreted as confirmation of 
market timing. 
Adding control variables to regression model, explanatory power improved as it was able to 
explain 87.42% of changes in book leverage. Profitability, risk, company size, PPE and interest 
rates were found to significantly influence book leverage. Profitability, risk, yield spread, PPE, 
liquidity and interest rates were found to negatively influence book leverage whereas MBR, 
inflation, company size and market were found to positively impact book leverage. 
MBR and book leverage were found to have a positive relationship indicating its positive 
influence on equity issues. This is consistent with Bougatef & Chichti, (2010) findings that MBR 
impacts positively on equity issues. These results suggest highly priced firms by market are 
likely to seek external equity. Corporate executives in these firms recognize their stocks to be 
highly valued by market and try to exploit these overvaluations. This evidence conforms with 
Alti, (2006);Baker & Wurgler, (2002);Graham & Harvey, (2001) findings that companies will 
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exploit opening windows for financing and issue securities when they notice their securities to be 
overvalued by market. The result contradicts findings of Mahajan & Tartaroglu, (2008) study 
that established a negative relation for G-7 countries which could not be attributed to equity 
market timing. 
Profitability and book leverage are negatively related which supports pecking order, Myers & 
Majluf, (1984) prediction that profitable firms have lower leverage ratios as they fund their 
investments internally. Risk and  book leverage are negatively related. Risky companies have 
lower leverage levels. Book leverage and yield spread are negatively related. When yield spread 
is quite high firms would prefer to issue equity to fund their investments and hence depressed 
book leverage levels hence the negative relationship between book leverage and yield spread. 
This relationship supports market timing in which managers would issue the form of financing 
whose market conditions are favourable. In this case the managers are avoiding the unfavourable 
market conditions in the debt market. 
 Tangibility was negatively related with book leverage meaning that companies with high levels 
of tangible assets have higher collateral value therefore they can borrow more easily than lower 
leverage firms. Liquidity was negatively related with book leverage meaning high liquidity 
levels in a firm would result in lower the leverage levels which concurs with pecking order 
theory Myers, (1984) who hypothesized that companies utilize internally generated funds first 
before seeking other sources of funds. Interest rates and book leverage were observed to be 
negatively related meaning that when interest rates are high or rising, companies will offer equity 
lowering book leverage ratio in conformity with debt market timing where corporate executives 
offer debt when interest rates are low. This findings concurs with, Henderson et al., (2006) 
findings that a negative relationship exists between interest rates levels and amount of debt 
issued in the countries they studied. 
Market which is a proxy for market performance has an insignificant positive sign which implies 
that performance of the stock market will stimulate debt issuance which concurs with the market 
timing theory since an improved performance in equity market should not drive companies to 
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issue debt. This contradicts with Lucas & McDonald, (1990) findings that abnormal positive 
share return and an abnormal rise in the market precede equity issuances.  Inflation positively 
influences book leverage. If inflation levels are high investors will have less disposable income 
therefore, they will not invest in a company’s shares. This will drive share prices down. This 
creates an unfavourable market condition for firms to issue equity hence firms will turn to debt 
hence increasing the book leverage ratios of the listed firms. A finding that conforms with Baker 
& Wurgler, (2002) findings that companies should borrow or offer stock when market conditions 
are favourable. 
Yield spread influences the decision for firms to offer debt and the direct impact on leverage 
levels in a firm. Large firms have propensity, coupled with capability and capacity to utilise debt 
in their capital structure hence a positive association between company size and book leverage.  
Finally, when market leverage was considered as response variable and MBR as predictor 
variable, MBR was able to explain 0.54% of total variations in market leverage. A statistically 
significant negative relationship was established between MBR and market leverage. A result 
conforming with Baker & Wurgler, (2002) findings that a strongly negatively correlation 
between leverage and their market timing measure. It concurs with Alti, (2006) findings that 
market timing shapes the funding activities of companies leading to short run variations from 
target leverage levels. The results agrees with  the findings of Moyo, (2016) who established a 
significant negative correlation between leverage and MBR which they argue confirms validity 
of market timing theory. 
Adding control variables to the regression model, only 18.53% of total variation in market 
leverage could be explained by MBR and control variables. Further MBR and company size 
were found to significantly influence market leverage. MBR, inflation, yield spread, PPE, 
liquidity, market and interest rates were observed to be negatively related with market leverage 
whereas profitability and company size were positively related with market leverage. 
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MBR was statistically significantly negatively correlated with market leverage, a result that 
conforms with Moyo, (2016) findings that leverage and MBR were significantly negatively 
correlated which the study argued confirms validity of market timing theory. It concurs with 
Baker & Wurgler, (2002) work findings that leverage was strongly negatively related to the 
historical market valuations measure.  
Inflation is insignificantly negatively correlation with market leverage. This is because when 
inflation increases the purchasing power declines. This means investors only focus on consuming 
the essentials and are not in a position to invest in equity of the listed companies generating 
unfavourable market conditions which drive market leverage levels down. This concurs with 
market timing theory Baker & Wurgler, (2002) that companies should borrow or offer stock if 
the market conditions are favourable. 
Yield spread is negatively correlated with market leverage. When yield spread is quite high firms 
would prefer to offer equity to fund their investments until debt market conditions becomes 
favourable. This drives market leverage levels higher. Once more the practice is market timing is 
established where managers of listed look at the over or under valuation of their securities when 
making their financing decisions. 
PPE was negatively correlated with market leverage. Firms with high levels of tangible assets 
prefer funding investments with debt raising their leverage levels hence the negative relation 
between PPE and market leverage. 
Liquidity was negatively correlated with market leverage. Highly liquid firms prefer use of 
internally generated finances to fund their investments driving market leverage levels lower. This 
test results supports pecking order theory, Myers & Majluf, (1984) that profitable firms have 
lower debt ratios since they prefer financing their investments internally. 
Market and market leverage were statistically insignificantly negatively related. If performance 
of capital market or existing conditions in the market are favourable, firms will respond by 
issuing more equity than debt which is conforms to market timing. This test results contravenes 
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Doukas et al., (2011) findings that when capital markets were perceived as conducive and 
adverse selection costs of equity were important considerations that influenced certain firms to 
issue more debt in hot than in cold-debt market periods. 
Interest rates were observed to be statistically insignificantly negatively related with market 
leverage. This evidence suggests that firms will issue debt when interest rates are high in contrast 
to market timing theory where high interest rates drive firms to issue equity.  
Profitability was observed to have a statistically insignificant positive relation with market 
leverage. This supports trade-off theory as advocated for by Modigliani & Miller, (1963) that a 
company’s profitability may be interpreted to mean firm performance and hence, profitable 
companies are in a position to repay their debt.  
Company size and market leverage are positively related. Large firms lower agency costs, cash 
flows that are less volatile and ease of access to capital markets are therefore expected to carry 
more debt in their capital structure than equity. 
5.2.3 Finance manager’s views with regard to market timing by NSE listed Companies 
The third study objective sought to establish the finance manager’s views with regard to market 
timing by the listed companies at the NSE. The finance managers indicated that overvaluation of 
company shares by the market was the most important factor they considered in their decision to 
issue equity which is in conformity with market timing. If shares are highly valued by market, 
then stock returns of companies will deteriorate after equity issuance as market corrects itself. 
This concurs with reviewed literature in which performance of firms stocks deteriorate after such 
issue which is consistent with market timing. This results agree with Ritter, (1991) findings that 
offering companies underperformed matching firms from the listing date to their 3-year 
anniversaries. Further conformity is established in Spiess & Affleck-Graves, (1995) findings that 
SEO post offering performance is quite similar to that of IPOs. They established that the median 
return in the 5-year period post the offering was 10%  for issuers compared to 42.3% of similar 
size, non-issuing firms in the same industry. Finance managers agreed that performance of 
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capital market and conditions existing in the market influenced their decision of equity issuance 
which concurs with equity market timing, Baker & Wurgler, (2002). They concurred with the 
statements that high market valuations as indicated by high MBR influenced their decision in 
equity issuance. A finding that concurs with Bougatef & Chichti, (2010) findings that French and 
Tunisian firms exploit market timing in raising capital since they issue equity when they think 
their shares are highly priced by the market and after a market performance improvement. These 
results conform to the market timing hypotheses.  
Finance managers indicated that high MBR influenced their decision to issue equity. This finding 
concurs with secondary data where MBR is found to statistically and significantly influence both 
market and book leverage. It conforms to reviewed literature in which high MBR influence the 
decision to issue equity and market timing hypothesis that equity issuers ought to have a higher 
MBR than debt issuers. These findings concur with Baker & Wurgler, (2002) findings that high 
leverage firms were those that raised capital during periods when their MBR were high and low 
leverage firms raised capital when their MBR were low. Logical to this findings is a study by 
Hovakimian, (2006) whose results suggest that equity issuer are timed to periods of high MBR. 
Taggart, (1977) found support for the notion that changes in pricing of equity and long-term debt 
are vital considerations that U.S Companies consider in security issuance.  
Finance managers further agree to have an optimal capital structure that they adhere to which 
contradicts the presence of market timing result presented by the secondary data and reviewed 
literature in which optimal capital structure does not exist (Baker & Wurgler, 2002). It conforms 
to Moyo, (2016),findings that financial services firms quoted at the JSE had optimal capital 
structures that they adhered to. Finally, finance managers indicated that conditions existing in 
capital markets and money markets influenced their decision to issue equity. This response 
concurs to Lucas & McDonald, (1990) finding that equity issuances are preceded on average by 





Finance managers further indicated that they issue debt when interest rates were low prior to 
their increase. Stock returns of corporate debt issuing firms indicate an underperformance of 
securities issuing firms when compared to similar size non-issuing firms suggesting that 
corporate executives issue their debt when prevailing interest rates are low and as the market 
corrects itself this leads to lower stock returns for such firms. A response that concurs with 
Graham & Harvey, (2001) and Bancel & Mittoo, (2004) findings that CFOs and managers claim 
that they actively attempt to time debt markets by making their debt issuances decisions and pick 
opportune moments to make such issues when interest rates are quite low. Further confirmation 
is found in Henderson et al.,(2006) findings that firms time both long term debt and short-term 
debt to coincide with low contemporaneous rates. 
Pricing of the debt security is another important factor that finance managers look at when 
making corporate debt issuances. This means that they pick opportune market times when debt is 
highly valued, or stock is lowly valued by the market to issue debt. This result concurs once 
more with the stock return results of the corporate debt issuing firms which recorded 
underperformed when compared to similar size non-issuing firms. This results concur with 
Marsh, (1982) findings that companies are heavily influenced by market conditions and past 
history of security prices in choosing between equity and debt 
 Finance managers also indicated that they looked at security issuance choices made by other 
listed or intended to be listed firms at the NSE. This results in a sort of clustering of the issues. 
They also argued that the success factors of a security issue would influence their decision on the 
type of financing that they utilize. If a certain company had issued a security and it turns out to 
be unsuccessful, potential security issuers would turn to alternative means of financing the 





5.3 Conclusions of the study 
Based on findings, the study concluded there is presence of market timing in securities issuance 
by NSE listed companies. This means that when listed companies at the NSE issue rights issue 
and corporate debts, they take advantage of opening windows for financing and issue the security 
that they recognized to be highly valued by the market. This means they market time their 
security issuance decisions. Baker & Wurgler, (2002) argued that market timing can be looked at 
from two perspectives. The first perspective is confirmation of short run presence of market 
timing. This study focused on establishing short run presence of market timing .Findings of the 
event study methodology indicate an underperformance of share prices of corporate debt and 
rights issuing firms ,which as per literature reviewed including  Ritter,(1991);Spiess & Affleck-
Graves,(1999);Spiess & Affleck-Graves,(1995) is an indication of firms exploiting short term 
fluctuations in securities valuation and making security issuance decisions. From stock returns 
analyses of securities issuing firms conclusions can be drawn that there is presence of market 
timing by securities issuing firms evidenced by deterioration in stock returns for all securities 
issuing firms. Hence, the study results affirms the first perspective of market timing theory as put 
forward by Baker & Wurgler, (2002). The second perspective is confirmation of persistence 
impact of market timing on capital structure which was not the focus of the current study. 
In as far as the relationship between market timing and capital structure are concerned, this study 
therefore concludes that MBR which is a measure and a proxy for market timing is found to 
statistically and significantly influence market leverage and book leverage which are measures 
and proxies for capital structure. MBR was found to influence book and market leverage as 
follows; MBR had a statistically significant negative association with market leverage for 
corporate debt and right issuing companies ; a statistically significant positive relationship with 
book leverage for rights issuing firms and statistically insignificant negative relationship when 
book leverage was used as response variable and MBR as explanatory variable which changes to 
insignificant positive relationship when the regression model including book leverage, MBR and 
control variables is used for corporate debt issuing firms. Other factors which were considered to 
be important determinants of capital structures were also found to significantly influence market 
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and book leverage. This control factors included, yield spread, liquidity, interest rates, risk, 
company size, profitability and PPE. 
The study concluded that the finance managers of the companies listed at the NSE have almost 
similar views with regard to market timing by the listed companies at the NSE. This is because 
big proportion of them agreed with most statements regarding equity and debt market timing.  
5.4 Limitations of the study 
Firms with high MBR which are expected to exploit misvaluation by the market and issue equity 
are often fast growing and as a result they may issue as much debt as equity and this beats their 
attempts to time the market.  
This study focused on all sectors of capital market. The financial sector in capital markets is 
highly regulated and hence their reporting standards and disclosures differ from those of the 
other sectors. In this study, 10 out of the 21 companies that made securities issue representing 
47.62% of the corporate debt and rights issues made by listed companies were issued by the 
listed banks and insurance companies that make up the financial sector of the capital market.  
The study did not receive 100% response rate from questionnaires administered during the study. 
The study covered the period 2006-2016 which indicates periods before and after were not 
considered thus the effect of the missing period could not be ruled out. 
5.5. Recommendations 
5.5.1 Recommendations for Practice 
 Based on this findings, the study recommends that listed companies at the NSE ought to engage 
more in market timing so as to achieve their goal of maximizing firms’ value for their 
shareholders. Firms’ managers should pinpoint windows of opportunities for financing where 
their securities are overvalued or under-priced due to irrational investors and capitalize on these. 
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Further, managers should align their interests with those of shareholders and debt holders since 
interest and principal are periodic payments which if not met a company may face bankruptcy or 
financial distress.  
The study has also shed light on why listed companies issue securities that constitute their capital 
structures and the reasons why timings of such security issuance decisions are of vital 
importance to managers of issuing firms in achieving their goal of minimizing overall cost of 
capital and maximizing firm value for shareholders. It has also gone further and highlighted the 
expected performance of shares for rights and corporate debt issuing firms before and after 
making the securities issuance. The study recommends that shareholders and investors should 
have a long-term investment goal when investing in securities issuing firms listed at the NSE. 
This is because shares underperform in terms of share price in the short run. 
Additionally, based on study findings, NSE listed companies market time their securities 
issuance decisions, CMA and the CBK should formulate better policies governing the issuance 
of securities and investor/shareholder protection policies by listed companies. 
5.5.2 Recommendations for further study 
According to Baker & Wurgler,(2002), equity market timing theory can be understood from two 
perspectives. Firstly, identification of presence of market timing in development of capital 
structures by firms, that is, confirming whether firms use or not use, windows for financing 
chances to offer equity or debt. Secondly, confirmation whether market timing effects are 
persistent in the long-term or only occur in the short-term, that is, if this practice is adopted 
endlessly by companies in structuring their capital structures, or whether the practice is 
temporary in which case companies will raise debt or equity levels again. Baker & Wurgler, 
(2002), observed that at first glance a short-run effect should be expected. In the sense that, if  
firms manage to rebalance their leverage levels with a certain rate of recurrence,  persistent 
influence of market timing on debt-equity mix cannot be  established, Flannery & 
Rangan,(2006). On the other hand, if rebalancing cannot be confirmed, use of market timing can 
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be taken to be a practice in funding choices of firms and hence issuance of shares or debt can be 
taken to be the outcome of continuous efforts to find the right market time for these new 
issuances.  
The current study focused on establishing existence of market timing in development of capital 
structures by firms. The study can be extended to confirm whether there is any long run 
persistent influence of market timing on debt-equity mix of quoted firms at the NSE. 
Two financing events undertaken by listed companies were focused on by the study; corporate 
debt and rights issuance. Further research can be undertaken on each of these events 
independently to confirm which event listed companies’ market time the most on and hence has 
a higher impact on the resultant capital structures. Further study can be conducted to confirm 
whether IPO issuing firms market time their security issuance decisions. 
 Baker & Wurgler,(2002) assert that companies should offer stocks when equity is highly priced 
and repurchase stocks when they are lowly priced. They contend that managers may choose 
alternative financing methods including internally generated funds and debt financing where the 
equity market conditions are unfavourable for the firms. The finance managers of listed firms 
highlighted that in circumstances where the markets were unfavourable, they would turn to 
alternative ways of financing such as long-term borrowing from commercial banks or turn to 
internally sourced funds to finance their investments. Share repurchase is not authorized in 
Kenya although the amended companies act, 2015 contains a provision allowing companies to 
repurchase their shares through the capital market. An area worth exploring in future after this 
provision is allowed is to examine how share repurchase will impact on capital structures of 
listed companies at the NSE. 
Market timing in this study was measured using MBR. Further research should be undertaken to 
confirm presence of market timing using a different measure of market timing such as the hot 
and cold markets measure utilised by Alti,(2006)  or a valuation model such as the earning based 
valuation model utilised by Elliott et al.,(2004) in the study of U.S market. 
114 
 
Finance managers responses indicated that, when making financing decisions they consider 
achieving an optimal capital structure. Evidence from market timing theory and empirical review 
suggest that an optimal capital structure does not exist. Further research can be undertaken to 
establish why finance managers think that when making financing decisions a target capital 
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Appendix II: The Research Questionnaire 
I am a Masters of Commerce student at the Strathmore business school, Strathmore University. 
In partial fulfilled of requirements of this degree program, I am carrying out a study titled 
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“Investigation into presence of market timing in configuration of capital structures of companies 
listed at the NSE.” Findings from this study will provide insights and recommendations for 
practitioners, academicians, government, and investors. The information supplied will be used 
only for academic purposes. Your confidentiality and that of your organization are guaranteed as 
no specific reference would be made as your responses or feedback. A full copy of this report 
can be availed to you at your request. I look forward to your participation. Thank you. 
Section 1: General information 
1. Please indicate your highest level of education 
Postgraduate [  ] Graduate [  ] Diploma [  ] Certificate [  ] 
2. How long have you worked with this company? 
0-2 years [  ]     2-5 years [  ]    5-10 years [  ]    More than 10 years [  ] 
Kindly answer the following questions with regard to your company’s financing decisions by 
ticking the most appropriate answer.  
Section 2: Capital structure 
3.  What type of financing does your organization utilize?  
i.  Retained earnings.   [  ]  
ii.   Debt.                       [  ] 
iii.   Equity.                    [  ] 
iv.  Hybrid securities.    [  ] 
v. All of the above.      [  ] 
If hybrid securities are used kindly comment on the mixture of the 
securities……………………………………………………………………………………… 
4.  Does your company have a target capital structure, such that the company has a given 
proportion of debt and equity it adheres to? Yes [  ] No [  ] 
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Section 3: Equity Market Timing 
5. The following statements relate to equity market timing in configuration of capital structures 
of firms. Kindly indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statements on a likert 
scale of 1-5 by ticking the most appropriate space.  
 
Section 4: Debt market timing 
6. The following statements relate to debt market timing in configuration of capital 
structures of firms. Kindly indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
statements on a likert scale of 1-5 by ticking the most appropriate space.  







If the equity price has been on the rise, the price at which
shares of a company are offered at  is high
Equity is only issued by the firm with an intention of
maintaining a target debt to equity ratio
The amount by which the stock is overvalued by the market is
an important factor put into consideration in issuing equity.
The amount by which the stock is undervalued by the market
is an important factor put into consideration in issuing equity.
Equity is issued in capital markets where security prices are
rising.
Equity is issued in capital markets where security prices are
expected to rise.
Equity is only issued when market valuation of firm is




Any factors considered in making equity and debt issuance decisions taken by your 
company............................................................................................................................................ 

















Corporate debt is only issued when interest rates are low just
before they increase.
The selling price of a corporate bond is considered before a
decision to issue the bond is made.
Corporate debt is issued with an intention of maintaining target
equity to debt ratio




Appendix III:  List of Rights Issue, Corporate Debt issues, matched firms and Listed 
Companies at the Nairobi Securities Exchange 
Rights Issues 
 







Number company Shares on issue Date of issue Offer price Sum raised Subscription level
1 DTB 15,527,343 2006 50 2,305,810,436 297%
2 Olympia 30,000,000 2007 14 428,400,000 102%
3 DTB 23,291,015 2007 70 2,902,060,469 178%
4 NIC Bank 16,482,910 2007 70 1,719,167,513 149%
5 HFCK 115,000,000 2008 20 2,369,000,000 103%
6 KCB 221,777,777 2008 25 8,122,024,075 146%
7 KCB 887,111,110 2010 17 12,500,000,000 82.50%
8 TPS East Africa 24,701,774 2010 48 1,185,685,152 135%
9 Standard Chartered 15,109,323 2010 165.45 2,499.837,490 161%
10 KPLC 488,630,245 2010 19.5 9,830,340,000 103%
11 KQ 1,477,169,549 2012 14 14,487,949,714 70.10%
12 DTB 24,455,566 2012 74 3,369,522,734 186.20%
13 NIC 98,724,391 2012 21 7,007,457,273 338%
14 CFCSTANBIC 121,637,427 2012 33 4,495,719,302 112%
15 SCB 22,080,000 2012 145 8,272,934,400 258%
16 DTB 22,010,009 2014 165 3,631,651,485 440.30%
17 NIC Bank 42,663,040 2014 49.25 1,904,030,511.50 221%
18 Uchumi Supermarket 99,500,000 2014 9 579,116,043 183.60%
19 HFCK 116,666,667 2015 30 9,011,836,920 257%
20 LONGHORN 126,190,476 Apr-16 4.2 533,000,000 101%





Corporate bonds issue by listed companies 
 








Issuer Approved amount Issued amount Date of approval Maturity Yield
1 Sasini Tea             600,000,000        600,000,000 Nov-07 Mar-12 11.75%
2 Barclays Bank  (1st Tranche)          1,000,000,000      1,000,000,000 Nov-07 Nov-14 0.6% above the most recent average 
182 day T-bill rate.
Barclays Bank (2nd Tranche)          2,000,000,000      2,000,000,000 Jul-08 Jul-15 1% above the most recent T-B rate
3 CFC Stanbic          5,000,000,000      2,402,000,000 Jun-09 Jun-16 FXD: 12.5% 
CFC Stanbic          5,000,000,000          98,000,000 Jun-09 Jun-16 FR: +1.75% above prevailing 182-day
T-Bill rates
CFC Stanbic          5,000,000,000      2,500,000,000 Dec-10 Dec-17 FXD 7.5%
4 KENGEN         25,000,000,000    25,000,000,000 Nov-09 Oct-19 FXD 12.5%
5 Safaricom  (1st Tranche)         12,000,000,000      7,500,000,000 Nov-09 Nov-14 FR: T.B (182) + 1.85% ,FXD: 12.25%
Safaricom (2nd Tranche )         12,000,000,000      4,500,000,000 Nov-10 Dec-15 FXD-7.75%/FR 185 basis points above 
the prevailing 182 day TB rates
6 Housing Finance (1st Tranche )         10,000,000,000      7,000,000,000 Sep-10 Oct-17 FXD: 8.5% - FR: 182 day + 3% with a 
floor of 5% and a cap of 9.5%
7 Centum          4,000,000,000      3,198,900,000 Sep-12 Sep-17 FXD 13.5% , FR:12.5%
8 I& M          3,655,000,000            3,655,000 Dec-13 Mar-19 FXD:12.5% ,FR: 182 day + 2%
9 BRITAM Medium Term Note          6,000,000,000      6,000,000,000 Jul-14 Jul-19 FXD: 13.0%
10 NIC Medium Term Note       5,514,000,000  5,514,000,000 Sep-14 Sep-19 FXD:12.5%
11 CIC Group Medium  Term Note       5,000,000,000  5,000,000,000 Oct-14 Oct-19 FXD: 13.0%











No Rights issuers Corporate Debt issuers combined list of the issuing firms
1 Diamond Trust Bank Sasini Tea Diamond Trust Bank
2 Olympia Capital Barclays Bank Olympia Capital
3 NIC bank CFC stanbic NIC bank
4 HFCK Kengen HFCK
5 Kenya Commercial Bank Safaricom Kenya Commercial Bank
6 TPS East Africa HFCK TPS East Africa
7 Standard Chartered Bank Centum Standard Chartered Bank
8 KPLC I&M bank KPLC
9 KQ Britam KQ
10 CFC Stanbic NIC Bank CFC Stanbic
11 Uchumi CIC Uchumi





















LISTED COMPANIES AT THE NAIROBI SECURITIES EXCHANGE AS AT 31ST 
DECEMBER 2018 
No. RIGHTS ISSUE COPRORATE DEBT TOTAL MATCHED FIRMS 
1 Barclays Bank BAT Barclays Bank
2 BAT Boc Kenya BAT
3 BOC Britam Boc Kenya
4 Britam Carbacid Britam
5 Carbacid CFC STANBIC Carbacid
6 CFc Stanbic CIC GROUP CFc Stanbic
7 CIC Group Equity Bank CIC Group
8 CoopBank Kakuzi CoopBank
9 DTB KCB DTB
10 EABL Kengen EABL
11 Equity Bank KENYA RE Equity Bank
12 Eveready KQ Eveready
13 Kakuzi Mumias Sugar Kakuzi
14 Kengen Nation Media KCB
15 Kenya RE NIC Bank Kengen
16 MUMIAS SUGAR Olympia Capital Kenya RE
17 Nation Media sanlam KQ
18 NIC Bank Scan Group MUMIAS SUGAR
19 NSE Standard Group Nation Media
20 Safaricom Uchumi NIC Bank
21 Sanlam Unga Group NSE
22 Sasini Tea williamson Tea Olympia Capital
23 Scangroup Safaricom
24 Total Kenya Sanlam
25 Transcentury Sasini Tea
26 UCHUMI Scan Group










Source (CMA Statistical bulletin Q4, 2018) 
Appendix IV: Kruskal Wallis test results for Pre and post CAR for rights issuing firms 
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS(REITS) SECTOR
Eaagads Ltd Stanlib Fahari I-REIT
Kapchorua Tea Company Co. Ltd
Kakuzi Ltd AUTOMOBILES AND ACCESSORIES SECTOR
Limuru Tea Co. Ltd Car and General (K) Ltd
Sasini Ltd Sameer Africa Ltd
Williamson Tea Kenya
COMMERCIAL AND SERVICES SECTOR
BANKING SECTOR Express Kenya Ltd
Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd Kenya Airways Ltd
Stanbic Holdings plc. Nation Media Group
Equity Bank Ltd Standard Group Ltd
Housing Finance Co. Kenya TPS Eastern Africa (Serena)
Diamond Trust Bank Kenya Scangroup Ltd
I&M Holdings Ltd Uchumi Supermarket
Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd Longhorn Publishers
National Bank of Kenya Ltd Deacons
NIC bank Ltd
Standard Chartered Bank ENERGY AND PETROLEUM SECTOR
The Co-operative Bank of Kenya KenolKobil Ltd
Bank of Kigali Total Kenya Ltd
Kengen Ltd
CONSTRUCTION AND ALLIED SECTOR Kenya Power & Lighting Co Ltd
Athi River Mining Umeme Ltd
Bamburi Cement Ltd
Crown Berger Ltd INVESTMENT SECTOR
East African Cables Ltd Centum Investment Co Ltd
East African Portland Cement Ltd Olympia Capital
Trans-Century Ltd
INSURANCE SECTOR
Jubilee Holdings Ltd INVESTMENT SERVICES SECTOR
Sanlam Kenya Plc Nairobi Securities Exchange Ltd
Kenya Re-Insurance Corporation Ltd
Liberty Kenya Holdings Ltd GROWTH ENTERPRISE MARKET SEGMENT(GEMS)
Britam Holdings Ltd Atlas African Industries
CIC Insurance Group Ltd Flame tree Group Holdings
Home Afrika Ltd
MANUFACTURING & ALLIED SECTOR Kurwitu Ventures
B.O.C Kenya Ltd Nairobi Business Ventures
British American Tobacco Kenya
Carbacid Investments Ltd EXCHANGE TRADED FUND
East African Breweries Ltd New Gold Issuer(RP) Ltd
Mumias Sugar Company Ltd
Unga Group Ltd FIXED INCOME SECURITIES MARKET
SEGMENT(PREFERENCE SHARE)
Eveready East Africa Ltd KPLC Ltd 4% Pref 20
Kenya Orchards Ltd KPLC Ltd 7% Pref 20













firms Test statistic (df) p-value
1 1 24.30 χ2 (2) = 30.168 1 16.80 χ2 (2) = 75.841
1 2 58.57 p = 0.000 2 75.50 p = 0.000
1 3 53.63 3 44.20
2 4 41.40 χ2 (2) = 53.314 4 30.17 χ2 (2) = 64.511
2 5 33.87 p = 0.000 5 42.83 p = 0.000
2 6 79.47 6 74.07
2 7 87.27 7 94.93
3 8 146.87 χ2 (2) = 98.806 8 70.83 χ2 (2) = 206.099
3 9 70.90 p = 0.000 9 60.20 p = 0.000
3 10 25.73 10 91.50
3 11 154.00 11 208.87
3 12 132.40 12 159.10
3 13 166.27 13 133.70
3 14 130.73 14 28.53
3 15 137.10 15 211.27
4 16 89.23 χ2 (2) = 41.516 16 75.37 χ2 (2) = 68.932
4 17 31.93 p = 0.000 17 15.50 p = 0.000
4 18 56.37 18 81.90
4 19 64.47 19 69.23
5 20 66.43 χ2 (2) = 52.252 20 70.30 χ2 (2) = 67.784
5 21 18.73 p = 0.000 21 15.50 p = 0.000
5 22 51.33 22 50.70
6 23 53.60 χ2 (2) = 43.527 23 63.77 χ2 (2) = 60.279
6 24 20.33 p = 0.000 24 15.50 p = 0.000
6 25 62.57 25 57.23
7 26 113.77 χ2 (2) = 78.631 26 114.93 χ2 (2) = 180.516
7 27 140.62 p = 0.000 27 173.27 p = 0.000
7 28 36.02 28 60.87
7 29 147.28 29 30.90
7 30 133.02 30 186.37
7 31 76.40 31 122.73
7 32 91.40 32 49.43
8 33 43.77 χ2 (2) = 34.624 33 45.50 χ2 (2) = 44.262
8 34 17.23 p = 0.000 34 15.50 p = 0.000
9 35 35.68 χ2 (2) = 19.636 35 19.20 χ2 (2) = 46.406
9 36 62.70 p = 0.000 36 55.63 p = 0.000
9 37 38.12 37 61.67
10 38 24.17 χ2 (2) = 145.698 38 15.50 χ2 (2) = 143.535
10 39 42.77 p = 0.000 39 48.30 p = 0.000
10 40 83.58 40 102.40
10 41 106.10 41 138.23
10 42 124.98 42 91.83
10 43 161.40 43 146.73
11 44 211.13 χ2 (2) = 90.413 44 210.30 χ2 (2) = 216.093
11 45 93.50 p = 0.000 45 159.93 p = 0.000
11 46 57.40 46 63.67
11 47 108.37 47 139.03
11 48 102.77 48 92.93
11 49 134.43 49 64.20
11 50 107.87 50 23.23
11 51 148.53 51 210.70
12 52 33.47 χ2 (2) = 80.370 52 116.33 χ2 (2) = 71.274
12 53 99.73 p = 0.000 53 68.83 p = 0.000
12 54 118.10 54 77.17
12 55 80.13 55 90.20
12 56 46.07 56 24.97
13 57 97.93 χ2 (2) = 60.609 57 103.23 χ2 (2) = 97.367
13 58 32.93 p = 0.000 58 29.30 p = 0.000
13 59 44.73 59 31.70
13 60 66.40 60 77.77
Pre CAR Post CAR
Mean rank Mean rank
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Test statistic (df) p-
value
1 56.87 χ2 (2) = 40.572 1 48.67 χ2 (2) =64.135
2 54.30 p = 0.000 2 75.33 p = 0.000
3 37.70 3 25.67
4 93.13 4 92.33
5 46.83 χ2 (2) = 37.303 5 71.07 χ2 (2) = 69.156
6 24.27 p = 0.000 6 49.93 p = 0.000
7 65.40 7 15.50
8 44.63 χ2 (2) = 39.295 8 45.50 χ2 (2) = 44.264
9 16.37 p = 0.000 9 15.50 p = 0.000
10 39.35 χ2 (2) = 71.736 10 47.63 χ2 (2) = 81.737
11 59.20 p = 0.000 11 64.53 p = 0.000
12 38.62 12 25.70
13 104.83 13 104.13
14 36.40 χ2 (2) = 6.848 14 21.80 χ2 (2) = 14.890
15 24.60 p = 0.009 15 39.20 p = 0.000
16 85.93 χ2 (2) = 71.596 16 99.4 χ2 (2) = 94.018
17 27.57 p = 0.000 17 26.4 p = 0.000
18 88 18 81.6
19 40.5 19 34.6
20 61.13 χ2 (2) = 19.055 20 70.97 χ2 (2) = 43.200
21 31.90 p = 0.000 21 35.00 p = 0.000
22 43.47 22 30.53
23 154.53 χ2 (2) = 121.397 23 165.00 χ2 (2) = 146.942
24 26.40 p = 0.000 24 32.43 p = 0.000
25 60.83 25 51.13
26 71.47 26 101.13
27 101.73 27 60.33
28 128.03 28 132.97
29 211.33 χ2 (2) = 75.000 29 224.27 χ2 (2) = 195.004
30 119.27 p = 0.000 30 76.97 p = 0.000
31 96.50 31 87.70
32 80.63 32 91.07
33 124.63 33 194.90
34 88.73 34 130.53
35 138.83 35 141.30
36 104.07 36 17.27
37 201.43 χ2 (2) = 175.324 37 198.70 χ2 (2) = 189.468
38 209.30 p = 0.000 38 222.17 p = 0.000
39 30.73 39 124.53
40 64.20 40 88.40
41 93.68 41 113.10
42 118.22 42 134.67
43 152.93 43 48.83
44 93.50 44 33.60
45 213.87 χ2 (2) = 146.752 45 225.50 χ2 (2) = 181.197
46 189.97 p = 0.000 46 185.77 p = 0.000
47 118.77 47 78.90
48 125.83 48 92.37
49 81.18 49 150.13
50 86.58 50 118.17
51 35.40 51 23.03
52 112.40 52 90.13
53 32.98 χ2 (2) = 1.213 53 29.20 χ2 (2) = 0.332
54 28.02 p = 0.271 54 31.80 p = 0.564
Post CAR




Appendix VI: Stationarity Test results for corporate debt and rights issues regression 
analysis 
Stationarity test for rights issue firms 
Variable Statistic p-value 
Book Leverage 26.3352 0.2376 
Market Leverage 24.9646 0.2988 
MBR 29.6329 0.1277 
Profitability 59.1219 0.0000 
Risk 0.0000 1.0000 
Inflation 205.2497 0.0000 
Yield spread 29.9344 0.1201 
Company Size 34.6506 0.0421 
PPE 24.2953 0.3319 
Liquidity 59.1289 0.0000 
Market 54.6326 0.0001 
Company growth 59.1289 0.0000 
Interest rate 69.5015 0.0000 
 
 
Stationarity test for corporate debt issuing firms 
 
Variable Statistic p-value 
Book Leverage 17.4924 0.7356 
Market Leverage 21.8260 0.4703 
MBR 101.9250 0.0000 
Profitability 94.3764 0.0000 
Risk 0.0000 1.0000 
Inflation 135.5975 0.0000 
Yield spread 30.8078 0.1001 
Company Size 7.4318 0.9984 
PPE        36.5209 0.0267 
Liquidity 68.9348 0.0000 
Market 38.0001 0.0183 
Company growth 101.9250 0.0000 







































CAR 30 Days 
after
Post CAR 
difference pre CAR remark Post CAR Remark
1 -0.0174 0.0404 0.0578 -0.0827 -0.1231 1 0.0701 -0.0020 -0.0721 -0.0263 -0.0243 Issuing firm overperformed Issuing firm underperformed
2 0.0393 -0.0336 -0.0730 0.0073 0.0410
3 0.0095 0.0495 0.0399 0.0051 -0.0443
2 0.0059 -0.0151 -0.0209 -0.0348 -0.0197 1 -0.0115 -0.0502 -0.0387 -0.0825 -0.0322 Issuing firm overperformed Issuing firm underperformed
2 0.0127 -0.5443 -0.5570 -0.5200 0.0243
3 -0.0031 0.1464 0.1495 0.1290 -0.0175 1 0.0187 -0.0115 -0.0301 0.0074 0.0189 Issuing firm overperformed Issuing firm underperformed
4 -0.0019 -0.1442 -0.1423 -0.0992 0.0450 1 -0.0052 -0.0324 -0.0272 -0.1202 -0.0878 Issuing firm underperformed Issuing firm overperformed
2 -0.0019 -0.0793 -0.0774 -0.0804 -0.0011
3 0.0038 0.0136 0.0098 -0.0287 -0.0423
5 0.0180 0.0390 0.0210 0.1375 0.0985 1 -0.0057 0.0501 0.0558 0.4323 0.3822 Issuing firm underperformed Issuing firm overperformed
6 0.0110 0.0898 0.0788 0.0723 -0.0175 1 0.0048 -0.0716 -0.0764 -0.1257 -0.0541 Issuing firm overperformed Issuing firm underperformed
2 -0.0068 0.0368 0.0436 0.0670 0.0302
3 -0.0079 -0.0269 -0.0190 -0.1065 -0.0796
7 0.0019 -0.0571 -0.0590 -0.0552 0.0018 1 0.0101 -0.1170 -0.1271 -0.0459 0.0711 Issuing firm underperformed Issuing firm underperformed
2 -0.0534 -0.0519 0.0015 -0.0654 -0.0135
0.0028 0.1693 0.1665 0.2899 0.1206 1 -0.0109 -0.0713 -0.0604 -0.1653 -0.0940 Issuing firm overperformed Issuing firm overperformed
2 0.0145 -0.0599 -0.0745 -0.1257 -0.0657
3 -0.0192 0.0001 0.0192 -0.0199 -0.0199
4 0.0382 -0.0366 -0.0748 -0.0816 -0.0450
5 -0.0028 -0.0264 -0.0236 0.0877 0.1141
8 -0.0025 0.2411 0.2436 0.2937 0.0526 1 -0.0075 0.0493 0.0568 -0.1874 -0.2367 Issuing firm overperformed Issuing firm overperformed
2 -0.0078 -0.0313 -0.0235 -0.0741 -0.0428
3 -0.0025 -0.0514 -0.0488 -0.1028 -0.0515
4 -0.0111 -0.0204 -0.0093 0.2132 0.2336
5 -0.0057 -0.0314 -0.0257 -0.0673 -0.0359
6 0.0055 -0.0574 -0.0628 -0.0686 -0.0112
7 -0.0025 -0.1338 -0.1312 -0.2875 -0.1537
9 -0.0043 0.1469 0.1512 0.0680 -0.0790 1 0.0302 0.1846 0.1544 0.2338 0.0492 Issuing firm underperformed Issuing firm underperformed
2 -0.0189 -0.2181 -0.1992 -0.0040 0.2141
3 0.0064 -0.1080 -0.1144 -0.1215 -0.0134
4 -0.0043 -0.0839 -0.0796 -0.0978 -0.0139
5 -0.0043 -0.0447 -0.0404 -0.0733 -0.0286
6 -0.0085 -0.0949 -0.0864 -0.2565 -0.1616
7 0.0374 -0.1048 -0.1422 -0.2863 -0.1815
10 -0.0075 0.1737 0.1811 0.1149 -0.0587 1 0.0262 -0.0292 -0.0554 0.0479 0.0771 Issuing firm overperformed Issuing firm underperformed
2 0.0125 -0.0417 -0.0542 -0.0727 -0.0310
3 0.0095 -0.0326 -0.0420 -0.0789 -0.0463
4 -0.0016 -0.0635 -0.0619 -0.0156 0.0479
5 -0.0016 -0.0566 -0.0550 -0.1010 -0.0443
6 -0.0638 -0.1612 -0.0974 -0.1671 -0.0059
0.0234 -0.0737 -0.0971 -0.0841 -0.0104
11 0.0038 0.0102 0.0064 0.0707 0.0605 1 0.0038 -0.0012 -0.0050 0.0896 0.0908 Issuing firm overperformed Issuing firm underperformed
Issuing firms Matching firms
